Russian-Turkish wars. Russian-Turkish wars Generals of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878

One of the most important external political tasks of Russia in the second half of the 18th century. the task was to get access to the Black Sea. Turkey and some European states stood in the way of its solution, they did not want the strengthening of Russia, the strengthening of its influence in the East.

In 1768 Turkey, instigated by France, declared war on Russia. To conduct hostilities in the south of the country, two armies were created - the first of General P.A. Rumyantsev and the second General Panin. In 1770, Kutuzov was transferred to Rumyantsev's army, which was operating against Turkish troops in Moldavia and Wallachia. The young officer was lucky: he entered the disposal of an outstanding commander.

During the hostilities of 1770, being the chief quartermaster in Rumyantsev's corps and being at the forefront of the advancing troops, Kutuzov performed difficult and responsible assignments, "asked for all dangerous cases" and became known to the army commander as a brave and capable staff officer. He takes an active part in the battles at the Ryaba Mogila, Larga and the Kagul River, in which the main forces of the Turks were defeated.

Subsequently, Kutuzov, with the rank of prime minister, was transferred from the army headquarters to the Smolensk Infantry Regiment, with whom he participated in a number of battles, including at Popesty. For the courage and courage shown in these battles, Kutuzov was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

For M.I. Kutuzov, these battles became an unforgettable school of military art. He comprehended the strategy of crushing Rumyantsev, who believed that "no one takes the city without finishing off the troops defending it." And here Kutuzov saw that Rumyantsev's strategy is not only and not always in the offensive. Kutuzov adopted the main ideas of Rumyantsev's strategy and tactics: the defeat and complete destruction of the enemy army, the coverage of the enemy army and attacks on it from the front, from the rear, from the flanks, and most importantly, the use of ingenuity in battle.

Kutuzov's service in Rumyantsev's army suddenly and absurdly stopped. One of Kutuzov's "friends" reported to Rumyantsev that during leisure hours, to the cheerful laughter of his comrades, Captain Kutuzov copied the gait and manners of the commander in chief. And the field marshal was very touchy and did not like jokers.

Impeccable service and military merit saved the young officer from the wrath of the commander in chief, he was satisfied with the transfer of the mocker to the Crimean army.

This event left a deep mark on the character of Mikhail Illarionovich for the rest of his life. He became secretive and distrustful. Outwardly, he was the same Kutuzov, cheerful and sociable, but people who knew him closely said that "people's hearts are open to Kutuzov, but his heart is closed to them."

In 1772, Kutuzov began his service in the Crimean army under the command of V.M. Dolgorukov. During the battle near the village of Shumy, where the Turkish landing force was entrenched, blocking the road to Alushta, Kutuzov, setting a personal example, with a banner in his hands, led the battalion to attack. In a hot battle, the Turks were driven out of their positions, the road to Alushta was open. In this battle, Kutuzov was seriously wounded in the head: "This staff officer received a bullet, which, hitting him between the eye and temple, went straight through in the same place on the other side of the face," Dolgorukov's report says. The wound was so severe that the doctors did not hope for recovery. But Kutuzov recovered. Arriving in St. Petersburg, he received a long vacation for treatment abroad. In addition, Kutuzov received, at the direction of Catherine 2, a thousand chervonets and was awarded the Order of St. George 4th degree.

Mikhail Illarionovich traveled a lot in Europe: he visited Prussia, Austria, Holland, Italy, England, where he not only received treatment, but also used the slightest opportunity to replenish his knowledge, to get acquainted with Western European military art and international politics. For the longest time he lived in Leiden - the then center of science. There he met with scientists, advanced people of Europe and European generals - Frederick II and Laudon.

Meanwhile, the war of 1768-74 ended with the defeat of Turkey. According to the Kuchuk-Kainarji Treaty, Russia received lands between the Dnieper and the Bug, a number of fortresses and the right to free navigation in the Black Sea through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits.

Upon returning to his homeland in 1777, Kutuzov was assigned to the troops stationed in the southern regions of Russia, in the Crimea. Suvorov served in the same theater of operations in those years. Those were comparatively peaceful years. As a result of the wars with Turkey, Crimea was declared independent, and the struggle with Turkey for influence over the Crimean Tatars continued. This struggle was carried out with the help of diplomacy, which Suvorov, as he himself said, did not like to do, therefore he provided Kutuzov with all the delicate political affairs that he performed to perfection. Here for the first time Kutuzov showed his diplomatic abilities. Highly appreciating Kutuzov's diplomacy, Suvorov said: "Oh, smart, oh, cunning, no one will deceive him."

During these years, Kutuzov again went through the Suvorov school of training and education of troops. What was born in the Astrakhan regiment twenty years ago, now got stronger and turned into Suvorov's "Science to win." Kutuzov comprehended the most important rules of the science of winning: "eye, speed, onslaught."

Another rule introduced by Suvorov, which Kutuzov applied in practice, was that "every warrior understands his maneuver." This was a revolution in the training and education of troops. In an era when linear tactics dominated, based on disbelief in the mind of soldiers lined up so that officers could constantly observe and direct every movement of a soldier, Suvorov developed the initiative of the troops. The soldiers of Suvorov and Kutuzov were those soldiers whose intelligence, combat ingenuity and courage were believed and developed.

All these were new phenomena in the art of war, they spread thanks to Suvorov, from him and from Rumyantsev Kutuzov in these years took over the offensive strategy, tactics and new methods of education and training of troops. Also at this time, Kutuzov began to advance in the service: at the request of Suvorov, he was promoted to colonel, in 1782 he received the rank of brigadier, and when in 1784 the first corps of huntsmen were formed - the best soldiers of the Russian army, one of the best was appointed to command the Bursk Jaeger Corps. her generals - M.I. Kutuzov.

In 1787 a new war broke out with Turkey. Kutuzov covered the borders of Russia along the Bug with his corps, then Kutuzov's troops were included in the active Yekaterinoslav army. The commander of the Yekaterinoslav army Potemkin decided to take the Black Sea Turkish fortress Ochakov. Russian troops, including Kutuzov's corps, laid siege to Ochakov. Potemkin hesitated with the assault, and military operations were limited to small clashes.

During one of the sorties, the Turks attacked the cover of the rangers of the Bug Corps. A serious battle ensued. Kutuzov led the troops on the attack and was seriously wounded. The bullet pierced the head on departure almost in the same place as in the first wound. Doctors sentenced him to death, believing that he would not live to see the morning. But Kutuzov survived, only his right eye began to go blind.

Having barely recovered from his wound, after three and a half months Kutuzov already participated in the assault and capture of Ochakov, as well as later in the battles on the Dniester and on the Bug, in the assault on the Khadzhibey castle, on the site of present-day Odessa. And everywhere: either with battalions of rangers, or at the head of Cossack detachments during the capture of the fortresses of Bendery and Akkerman and in field battles - Kutuzov always, according to contemporaries, "took the surface."

It was 1790, the war dragged on, military operations did not bring the desired results for Russia. The Russian government decided to achieve a major victory in order to quickly force the Turks to conclude a profitable peace. Having taken several fortresses, the Russian army approached the strong fortress of Izmail. Located on the Danube, it was of exceptional strategic importance.

Russian troops, including Kutuzov, numbered 30 thousand people, and the garrison of the fortress - more than 36 thousand. The Turks were well supplied with ammunition and food, so Potemkin, not risking taking over the leadership of the siege, urgently asked Suvorov in a letter to help take the fortress.

The decision to take Izmail was made at the Military Council, where Suvorov addressed those present, among whom was Kutuzov, with the following words: “It is true that the difficulties are great: the fortress is strong, the garrison is a whole army, but nothing can stand against Russian weapons ... I decided to seize this fortress.

In accordance with the disposition, Kutuzov commanded the 6th assault column on the left flank, which was supposed to attack the bastion near the Kiliya Gates. At 5 o'clock in the morning on December 11, the signal for the assault was given. Despite the fierce fire, the storming columns approached the counterscarp in the dark, filled the ditches with fascines, quickly went down and, placing ladders against the rampart, climbed it.

Kutuzov's column burst onto the shaft, where a heavy hand-to-hand fight ensued. At some point, the Turks began to push Kutuzov, and he turned to Suvorov for support, but he, knowing that his student would manage without reinforcements, sent an officer with the message that a report had been sent about the capture of Ishmael and Kutuzov was appointed his commandant. At this difficult moment, Kutuzov brought his entire reserve into battle, overturned the Turks and captured the bastion. By dawn, the Russian troops drove the enemy out of the outer fortifications, and after 6 hours they destroyed the Turkish detachments that remained on the streets of the city.

Introducing Kutuzov to be awarded for Ishmael, Suvorov wrote about his beloved student and comrade-in-arms: “Major General and Cavalier Golenishchev-Kutuzov showed new experiments in art and his courage, overcame all difficulties under heavy enemy fire, climbed the rampart, took possession of the bastion, and when an excellent enemy forced him to stop, he, serving as an example of courage, held his place, overcame a strong enemy, established himself in the fortress and continued to defeat enemies ... He walked on the left flank, but was my right hand ... ".

After the fall of Izmail, Kutuzov asked the commander: “Why did Your Excellency congratulate me on my appointment as commandant, when success was still doubtful?” “Suvorov knows Kutuzov, and Kutuzov knows Suvorov,” came the answer. “If Ishmael had not been taken, we would both have died under its walls.” For Ishmael Kutuzov was awarded the Order of St. George 3rd degree and the rank of lieutenant general. At the final stage of the war with Turkey, the role of Kutuzov increased.

Kutuzov remained the commandant of Izmail and the head of the troops located between the Dniester and the Prut. The capture of the strategically main fortress, although it predetermined the outcome of the war, but the struggle for crossings on the Danube, for the cities of Machin, Babadag and for the Black Sea coast continued. Kutuzov led her in the difficult conditions of mountainous terrain against the mobile and numerous detachments of the Turks. In addition to his inherent calmness and foresight, he showed a remarkable art of maneuvering on the flanks and rear of the enemy, the greatest stubbornness and determination in the attack. He becomes one of the famous and recognized generals of the Russian army.

In 1791, a peace was concluded in the city of Iasi, according to which Turkey ceded to Russia the lands between the Southern Bug and Dniester rivers and agreed to recognize the annexation of Crimea to Russia. This ended the age-old struggle for access to the Black Sea, necessary for the economic development of Russia.

With the end of the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791. ended an important period in the life and work of Kutuzov. In the harsh practice of military everyday life, in heated battles with enemies on the fields of bloody battles, the formation of one of the most talented and original commanders of Russia took place. By the beginning of the 19th century, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov had grown into a military leader on a large scale, possessing deep knowledge of military affairs and combat experience, capable of solving complex problems in the field of strategy and tactics.

No one knows anything in advance. And the greatest misfortune can befall a person in the best place, and the greatest happiness will find him - in the worst..

Alexander Solzhenitsyn

In the foreign policy of the Russian Empire in the 19th century, there were four wars with the Ottoman Empire. Russia won three of them, lost one. The last war in the 19th century between the two countries was the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, in which Russia won. The victory was one of the results of the military reform of Alexander 2. As a result of the war, the Russian Empire regained a number of territories, and also helped to acquire the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania. In addition, for non-intervention in the war, Austria-Hungary received Bosnia, and England received Cyprus. The article is devoted to the description of the causes of the war between Russia and Turkey, its stages and main battles, the results and historical consequences of the war, as well as the analysis of the reaction of Western European countries to the growing influence of Russia in the Balkans.

What were the causes of the Russian-Turkish war?

Historians identify the following reasons for the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878:

1. Exacerbation of the "Balkan" issue.
2. Russia's desire to regain its status as an influential player in the foreign arena.
3. Russia's support for the national movement of the Slavic peoples in the Balkans, seeking to expand its influence in the region. This caused intense resistance from the countries of Europe and the Ottoman Empire.
4. The conflict between Russia and Turkey over the status of the straits, as well as the desire for revenge for the defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-1856.
5. Turkey's unwillingness to compromise, ignoring not only the demands of Russia, but also the European community.

Now let's look at the causes of the war between Russia and Turkey in more detail, since it is important to know and correctly interpret them. Despite the lost Crimean War, Russia, thanks to some reforms (primarily military ones) of Alexander II, again became an influential and strong state in Europe. This forced many politicians in Russia to think about revenge for the lost war. But this was not even the most important thing - much more important was the desire to return the right to have the Black Sea Fleet. In many ways, to achieve this goal, the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 was unleashed, which we will discuss briefly later.

In 1875, an uprising against Turkish rule began on the territory of Bosnia. The army of the Ottoman Empire brutally suppressed it, but already in April 1876 an uprising began in Bulgaria. Turkey dealt with this national movement as well. In protest against the policy towards the South Slavs, and also wishing to realize their territorial tasks, Serbia in June 1876 declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Serbian army was much weaker than the Turkish one. Since the beginning of the 19th century, Russia has positioned itself as a defender of the Slavic peoples in the Balkans, so Chernyaev went to Serbia, as well as several thousand Russian volunteers.

After the defeat of the Serbian army in October 1876 near Dyunish, Russia called on Turkey to stop hostilities and guarantee the cultural rights of the Slavic people. The Ottomans, feeling the support of Britain, ignored the ideas of Russia. Despite the obviousness of the conflict, the Russian Empire tried to resolve the issue peacefully. This is evidenced by several conferences convened by Alexander II, in particular in January 1877 in Istanbul. Ambassadors and representatives of key European countries gathered there, but did not come to a common decision.

In March, an agreement was signed in London, which obliged Turkey to carry out reforms, but the latter completely ignored it. Thus, Russia was left with only one option for resolving the conflict - a military one. Until the last, Alexander 2 did not dare to start a war with Turkey, as he was worried that the war would again turn into resistance of European countries to Russia's foreign policy. On April 12, 1877, Alexander II signed a manifesto declaring war on the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the emperor concluded an agreement with Austria-Hungary on the non-accession of the latter on the side of Turkey. In exchange for neutrality, Austria-Hungary was to receive Bosnia.

Map of the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878

Major battles of the war

In the period April-August 1877, several important battles took place:

• Already on the first day of the war, Russian troops captured key Turkish fortresses on the Danube, and also crossed the Caucasian border.
• On April 18, Russian troops captured Bayazet, an important Turkish stronghold in Armenia. However, already in the period of June 7-28, the Turks tried to carry out a counteroffensive, the Russian troops withstood in a heroic struggle.
• At the beginning of the summer, General Gurko's troops captured the ancient Bulgarian capital of Tarnovo, and on July 5 they established control over the Shipka Pass, through which the road to Istanbul went.
• During May-August, Romanians and Bulgarians massively began to create partisan detachments to help the Russians in the war against the Ottomans.

Battle of Plevna in 1877

The main problem of Russia was that the inexperienced brother of the emperor Nikolai Nikolayevich commanded the troops. Therefore, individual Russian troops actually acted without a center, which means they acted as uncoordinated units. As a result, on July 7-18, two unsuccessful attempts to storm Plevna were made, as a result of which about 10 thousand Russians died. In August, the third assault began, which turned into a protracted blockade. At the same time, from August 9 until December 28, the heroic defense of the Shipka Pass lasted. In this sense, the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, even briefly, seems to be very contradictory in terms of events and personalities.

In the autumn of 1877, a key battle took place near the fortress of Plevna. By order of Minister of War D. Milyutin, the army abandoned the assault on the fortress, and moved on to a systematic siege. The army of Russia, as well as its ally Romania, numbered about 83 thousand people, and the garrison of the fortress consisted of 34 thousand soldiers. The last battle near Plevna took place on November 28, the Russian army emerged victorious and was finally able to capture the impregnable fortress. This was one of the biggest defeats of the Turkish army: 10 generals and several thousand officers were taken prisoner. In addition, Russia was establishing control over an important fortress, opening its way to Sofia. This was the beginning of a turning point in the Russian-Turkish war.

Eastern front

On the eastern front, the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 also developed rapidly. In early November, another important strategic fortress, Kars, was captured. Due to simultaneous failures on two fronts, Turkey completely lost control over the movement of its own troops. On December 23, the Russian army entered Sofia.

In 1878, Russia entered with a complete advantage over the enemy. On January 3, the assault on Philipopol began, and already on the 5th the city was taken, the road to Istanbul was opened before the Russian Empire. On January 10, Russia enters Adrianople, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire is a fact, the Sultan is ready to sign peace on Russia's terms. Already on January 19, the parties agreed on a preliminary agreement, which significantly strengthened the role of Russia in the Black and Marmara Seas, as well as in the Balkans. This caused the strongest fear of the countries of Europe.

The reaction of major European powers to the successes of Russian troops

Most of all, England expressed dissatisfaction, which already at the end of January brought a fleet into the Sea of ​​​​Marmara, threatening an attack in the event of a Russian invasion of Istanbul. England demanded to move Russian troops away from the Turkish capital, and also to start developing a new treaty. Russia found itself in a difficult situation that threatened to repeat the scenario of 1853-1856, when the entry of European troops violated Russia's advantage, which led to defeat. Given this, Alexander 2 agreed to revise the treaty.

On February 19, 1878, in San Stefano, a suburb of Istanbul, a new treaty was signed with the participation of England.

The main outcomes of the war were recorded in the San Stefano Peace Treaty:

• Russia annexed Bessarabia, as well as part of Turkish Armenia.
• Turkey paid the Russian Empire an indemnity of 310 million rubles.
• Russia received the right to have the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.
• Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained independence, and Bulgaria received this status 2 years later, after the final withdrawal of Russian troops from there (which were there in case Turkey tried to return the territory).
• Bosnia and Herzegovina received the status of autonomy, but were actually occupied by Austria-Hungary.
• In peacetime, Turkey was supposed to open ports for all ships that were heading to Russia.
• Turkey was obliged to organize reforms in the cultural sphere (in particular for the Slavs and Armenians).

However, these conditions did not suit the European states. As a result, in June-July 1878, a congress was held in Berlin, at which some decisions were revised:

1. Bulgaria was divided into several parts, and only the northern part received independence, while the southern part returned to Turkey.
2. The contribution amount has been reduced.
3. England received Cyprus, and Austria-Hungary the official right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

war heroes

The Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 traditionally became a "minute of glory" for many soldiers and military leaders. In particular, several Russian generals became famous:

• Joseph Gurko. Hero of the capture of the Shipka Pass, as well as the capture of Adrianople.
• Mikhail Skobilev. He led the heroic defense of the Shipka Pass, as well as the capture of Sofia. He received the nickname "White General", and among the Bulgarians is considered a national hero.
• Mikhail Loris-Melikov. Hero of the battles for Bayazet in the Caucasus.

In Bulgaria there are over 400 monuments erected in honor of the Russians who fought in the war against the Ottomans in 1877-1878. There are many memorial plaques, mass graves, etc. One of the most famous monuments is the Freedom Monument on the Shipka Pass. There is also a monument to Emperor Alexander 2. There are also many settlements named after the Russians. Thus, the Bulgarian people thank the Russians for the liberation of Bulgaria from Turkey, and the cessation of Muslim rule, which lasted more than five centuries. During the war years, the Bulgarians themselves called the Russians "brothers", and this word remained in the Bulgarian language as a synonym for "Russians".

History reference

The historical significance of the war

The Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 ended with the complete and unconditional victory of the Russian Empire, but despite the military success, the European states put up a swift resistance to the strengthening of Russia's role in Europe. In an effort to weaken Russia, England and Turkey insisted that not all the aspirations of the southern Slavs were realized, in particular, not the entire territory of Bulgaria gained independence, and Bosnia passed from the Ottoman occupation to the Austrian one. As a result, the national problems of the Balkans became even more complicated, as a result turning this region into a "powder keg of Europe". It was here that the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne took place, becoming the pretext for the start of the First World War. This is generally a funny and paradoxical situation - Russia wins victories on the battlefield, but over and over again suffers defeats in the diplomatic fields.

Russia regained its lost territories, the Black Sea Fleet, but never achieved the desire to dominate the Balkan Peninsula. This factor was also used by Russia when entering the First World War. For the Ottoman Empire, which was completely defeated, the idea of ​​​​revenge was preserved, which forced it to enter into a world war against Russia. These were the results of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, which we briefly reviewed today.

Relying on the friendly neutrality of Russia, Prussia from 1864 to 1871 won victories over Denmark, Austria and France, and then carried out the unification of Germany and the creation of the German Empire. The defeat of France by the Prussian army allowed, in turn, Russia to abandon the embarrassing articles of the Paris Agreement (first of all, the ban on having a navy on the Black Sea). The pinnacle of the German-Russian rapprochement was the creation in 1873 of the "Union of the Three Emperors" (Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary). The alliance with Germany, with the weakening of France, allowed Russia to intensify its policy in the Balkans. The reason for intervention in Balkan affairs was the Bosnian uprising of 1875 and the Serbo-Turkish war of 1876. The defeat of Serbia by the Turks and their brutal suppression of the uprising in Bosnia aroused strong sympathy in Russian society, which wanted to help the "Slav brothers". But there were disagreements in the Russian leadership about the advisability of a war with Turkey. Thus, Minister of Foreign Affairs A.M. Gorchakov, Minister of Finance M.X. Reitern and others considered Russia unprepared for a serious clash that could cause a financial crisis and a new conflict with the West, primarily with Austria-Hungary and England. Throughout 1876, diplomats sought a compromise, which Turkey avoided in every possible way. She was supported by England, which saw in the kindling of a military fire in the Balkans an opportunity to divert Russia from affairs in Central Asia. In the end, after the Sultan's refusal to reform his European provinces, Emperor Alexander II declared war on Turkey on April 12, 1877. Previously (in January 1877), Russian diplomacy managed to settle the friction with Austria-Hungary. She remained neutral for the right to occupy Turkish possessions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia regained the territory of southern Bessarabia, lost in the Crimean campaign. It was also decided not to create a large Slavic state in the Balkans.

The plan of the Russian command provided for the end of the war within a few months, so that Europe would not have time to intervene in the course of events. Since Russia had almost no fleet on the Black Sea, repeating the route of Dibich's campaign against Constantinople through the eastern regions of Bulgaria (near the coast) became difficult. Moreover, in this area there were powerful fortresses Silistria, Shumla, Varna, Ruschuk, forming a quadrangle, in which the main forces of the Turkish army were located. Progress in this direction threatened the Russian army with protracted battles. Therefore, it was decided to bypass the sinister quadrangle through the central regions of Bulgaria and go to Constantinople through the Shipka Pass (a pass in the Stara Planina mountains, on the Gabrovo-Kazanlak road. Height 1185 m.).

Two main theaters of military operations can be distinguished: the Balkan and the Caucasian. The main one was the Balkan, where military operations can be divided into three stages. The first (until mid-July 1877) included the crossing of the Danube and the Balkans by Russian troops. The second stage (from the second half of July to the end of November 1877), during which the Turks carried out a number of offensive operations, and the Russians, in general, were in a state of positional defense. The third, final stage (December 1877 - January 1878) is associated with the offensive of the Russian army through the Balkans and the victorious end of the war.

First stage

After the outbreak of the war, Romania took the side of Russia, letting the Russian troops through its territory. By the beginning of June 1877, the Russian army, led by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (185 thousand people), concentrated on the left bank of the Danube. She was opposed by approximately equal in number of troops under the command of Abdul-Kerim Pasha. Most of them were located in the already indicated quadrangle of fortresses. The main forces of the Russian army concentrated somewhat to the west, near Zimnitsa. The main crossing over the Danube was being prepared there. Even further west, along the river, from Nikopol to Vidin, the Romanian troops (45 thousand people) were located. In terms of combat training, the Russian army was superior to the Turkish. But in terms of the quality of weapons, the Turks surpassed the Russians. In particular, they were armed with the latest American and British rifles. The Turkish infantry had more ammunition and trench tools. Russian soldiers had to save shots. An infantryman who used up more than 30 rounds of ammunition (more than half of the cartridge bag) during the battle was threatened with punishment. A strong spring flood of the Danube prevented the crossing. In addition, the Turks had up to 20 battleships on the river that controlled the coastal zone. April and May passed in the fight against them. In the end, Russian troops, with the help of coastal batteries and mine boats, inflicted damage on the Turkish squadron and forced it to take refuge in Silistria. It was only after this that the opportunity for the crossing arose. On June 10, units of the XIV Corps of General Zimmermann crossed the river near Galati. They occupied Northern Dobruja, where they stayed idle until the end of the war. It was a distraction. Meanwhile, the main forces secretly accumulated near Zimnitsa. Opposite it, on the right bank, lay the fortified Turkish point of Sistovo.

Crossing at Sistovo (1877). On the night of June 15, between Zimnitsa and Sistovo, the 14th division of General Mikhail Dragomirov crossed the river. Soldiers crossed in black winter uniforms to remain unnoticed in the dark. The first to land on the right bank without a single shot was the 3rd Volyn company, led by Captain Fok. The following units crossed the river already under heavy fire and immediately went into battle. After a fierce assault, the Sist fortifications fell. Russian losses during the crossing amounted to 1.1 thousand people. (killed, wounded and drowned). By June 21, 1877, sappers built a floating bridge near Sistovo, along which the Russian army crossed to the right bank of the Danube. The next plan was as follows. An advanced detachment under the command of General Iosif Gurko (12 thousand people) was intended for an offensive through the Balkans. To ensure the flanks, two detachments were created - the Eastern (40 thousand people) and the Western (35 thousand people). The eastern detachment, led by the heir Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich (future Emperor Alexander III), held back the main Turkish troops from the east (from the side of the fortress quadrangle). The western detachment, led by General Nikolai Kridiger, had the goal of expanding the invasion zone in a westerly direction.

The capture of Nikopol and the first assault on Plevna (1877). Carrying out the assigned task, on July 3, Kridiger attacked Nikopol, which was defended by a 7,000-strong Turkish garrison. After a two-day assault, the Turks capitulated. Russian losses during the attack amounted to about 1.3 thousand people. The fall of Nikopol reduced the threat of a flank attack on the Russian crossings at Sistovo. On the western flank, the Turks had the last large detachment in the Vidin fortress. It was commanded by Osman Pasha, who managed to change the initial stage of the war, which was favorable for the Russians. Osman Pasha did not wait in Vidin for further actions by Kridiger. Taking advantage of the passivity of the Romanian army on the right flank of the allied forces, the Turkish commander left Vidin on July 1 and moved towards the Western detachment of the Russians. Overcoming 200 km in 6 days. Osman Pasha took up defense with a 17,000-strong detachment in the Plevna region. This decisive maneuver came as a complete surprise to Kridiger, who, after the capture of Nikopol, decided that the Turks were finished in this area. Therefore, the Russian commander was inactive for two days, instead of immediately taking possession of Plevna. By the time he woke up, it was already too late. Danger loomed over the right flank of the Russians and over their crossing (Plevna was 60 km from Sistovo). As a result of the occupation of Plevna by the Turks, the corridor for the offensive of Russian troops in the southern direction narrowed to 100-125 km (from Plevna to Ruschuk). Kridiger decided to rectify the situation and immediately sent the 5th division of General Schilder-Schulder (9 thousand people) against Plevna. However, the allocated forces were not enough, and the assault on Plevna on July 8 ended in failure. Having lost about a third of his forces during the attack, Schilder-Schulder was forced to retreat. The damage of the Turks amounted to 2 thousand people. This failure influenced the actions of the Eastern Detachment. He abandoned the blockade of the Rushuk fortress and went on the defensive, since the reserves for his reinforcement were now transferred to Plevna.

Gurko's first Trans-Balkan campaign (1877). While the Eastern and Western detachments were settling in on the Sistov patch, parts of General Gurko quickly moved south to the Balkans. On June 25, the Russians occupied Tarnovo, and on July 2 they crossed the Balkans through the Heineken Pass. To the right, through the Shipka Pass, a Russian-Bulgarian detachment led by General Nikolai Stoletov (about 5 thousand people) advanced. On July 5-6, he attacked Shipka, but was repulsed. However, on July 7, the Turks, having learned about the capture of the Heineken Pass and the movement to the rear of Gurko's units, left Shipka. The way through the Balkans was open. Russian regiments and detachments of Bulgarian volunteers descended into the Rose Valley, enthusiastically received by the local population. The message of the Russian tsar to the Bulgarian people also contained the following words: “Bolgars, my troops have crossed the Danube, where they have fought more than once to alleviate the plight of the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula ... The task of Russia is to create, not to destroy. appease all nationalities and all confessions in those parts of Bulgaria where people of different origins and different faiths live together ... ". Advanced Russian units appeared 50 km from Adrianople. But this was the end of Gurko's promotion. He did not have enough forces for a successful massive offensive that could decide the outcome of the war. The Turkish command had reserves to repel this bold, but largely improvised onslaught. To protect this direction, the corps of Suleiman Pasha (20 thousand people) was transferred by sea from Montenegro, which closed the road to Gurko's units on the Eski-Zagra - Yeni-Zagra line. In fierce battles on July 18-19, Gurko, who did not receive sufficient reinforcements, managed to defeat the Turkish division of Reuf Pasha near Yeni-Zagra, but suffered a heavy defeat near Eski-Zagra, where the Bulgarian militia was defeated. Gurko's detachment retreated to the passes. This was the end of the First Trans-Balkan Campaign.

Second assault on Plevna (1877). On the day when Gurko's divisions fought under two Zagrams, General Kridiger with a 26,000-strong detachment undertook a second assault on Plevna (July 18). By that time, its garrison had reached 24 thousand people. Thanks to the efforts of Osman Pasha and the talented engineer Teutik Pasha, Plevna turned into a formidable stronghold surrounded by defensive fortifications and redoubts. The scattered frontal onslaught of the Russians from the east and south crashed against the powerful Turkish defense system. Having lost more than 7 thousand people in fruitless attacks, Kridiger's troops retreated. The Turks lost about 4 thousand people. Panic erupted at the Sistov crossing at the news of this defeat. The approaching detachment of Cossacks was mistaken for the Turkish vanguard of Osman Pasha. There was a shootout. But Osman Pasha did not attack Sistovo. He limited himself to an onslaught in a southerly direction and the occupation of Lovcha, hoping from here to come into contact with the troops of Suleiman Pasha advancing from the Balkans. The second Plevna, along with the defeat of the Gurko detachment at Eski-Zagra, forced the Russian troops to go on the defensive in the Balkans. The Guards Corps was called from St. Petersburg to the Balkans.

Balkan theater of operations

Second phase

In the second half of July, Russian troops in Bulgaria took up defensive positions in a semicircle, the rear of which rested on the Danube. Their lines passed in the area of ​​Plevna (in the west), Shipka (in the south) and east of the Yantra River (in the east). On the right flank against the corps of Osman Pasha (26 thousand people) in Plevna stood the Western Detachment (32 thousand people). In the Balkan sector, 150 km long, the army of Suleiman Pasha (brought to 45 thousand people by August) was held back by the Southern Detachment of General Fyodor Radetsky (40 thousand people). On the eastern flank, 50 km long, against the army of Mehmet Ali Pasha (100 thousand people), the Eastern Detachment (45 thousand people) was located. In addition, the 14th Russian Corps (25 thousand people) in Northern Dobruja was held back on the Chernavoda-Kyustenji line by roughly equal numbers of Turkish units. After the success at Plevna and Eski-Zagra, the Turkish command lost two weeks to agree on an offensive plan, thereby missing an opportunity to inflict a serious defeat on the upset Russian units in Bulgaria. Finally, on August 9-10, Turkish troops went on the offensive in the southern and eastern directions. The Turkish command planned to break through the positions of the Southern and Eastern detachments, and then, by combining the forces of the armies of Suleiman and Mehmet Ali, with the support of Osman Pasha's corps, throw the Russians into the Danube.

The first assault on Shipka (1877). At first, Suleiman Pasha went on the offensive. He struck the main blow at the Shipka Pass in order to open the road to Northern Bulgaria and connect with Osman Pasha and Mehmet Ali. As long as the Russians held Shipka, the three Turkish armies remained separated. The pass was occupied by the Orlovsky regiment and the remnants of the Bulgarian militia (4.8 thousand people) under the command of General Stoletov. Due to the approaching reinforcements, his detachment increased to 7.2 thousand people. Suleiman singled out the shock forces of his army against them (25 thousand people). On August 9, the Turks stormed Shipka. Thus began the famous six-day Battle of Shipka, which glorified this war. The fiercest battles unfolded near the rock "Eagle's Nest", where the Turks, regardless of losses, attacked the strongest part of the Russian positions in the forehead. Having shot the cartridges, the defenders of Orlinoye, suffering from terrible thirst, fought off the Turkish soldiers climbing onto the pass with stones and rifle butts. After three days of furious onslaught, Suleiman Pasha was preparing for the evening of August 11 to finally destroy a handful of still resisting heroes, when suddenly the mountains announced a resounding "Hurrah!" The advanced units of the 14th division of General Dragomirov (9 thousand people) arrived in time to help the last defenders of Shipka. Having marched more than 60 km at a fast pace in the summer heat, they attacked the Turks in a furious impulse and drove them back from the pass with a bayonet. The defense of Shipka was led by General Radetsky, who arrived at the pass. On August 12-14, the battle flared up with renewed vigor. Having received reinforcements, the Russians launched a counteroffensive and tried (August 13-14) to capture the heights west of the pass, but were repelled. The fighting took place in incredibly difficult conditions. Especially painful in the summer heat was the lack of water, which had to be delivered 17 miles away. But in spite of everything, desperately fighting from privates to generals (Radetsky personally led the soldiers into attacks), the defenders of Shipka managed to defend the pass. In the battles of August 9-14, the Russians and Bulgarians lost about 4 thousand people, the Turks (according to their data) - 6.6 thousand people.

Battle on the Lom River (1877). While the battles on Shipka were raging, an equally serious threat loomed over the positions of the Eastern Detachment. On August 10, the main army of the Turks, under the command of Mehmet Ali, twice outnumbered, went on the offensive. If successful, the Turkish troops could break through to the Sistovskaya crossing and Plevna, as well as go to the rear of the defenders of Shipka, which threatened the Russians with a real disaster. The Turkish army delivered the main blow in the center, in the Byala region, trying to cut the positions of the Eastern Detachment in two. After fierce fighting, the Turks captured a strong position on the heights near Katselev and crossed the Cherni Lom River. Only the courage of the commander of the 33rd division, General Timofeev, who personally led the soldiers into a counterattack, made it possible to stop the dangerous breakthrough. Nevertheless, the heir Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich decided to withdraw his battered troops to a position to Byala, near the Yantra River. On August 25-26, the Eastern Detachment skillfully retreated to a new defensive line. Having regrouped their forces here, the Russians reliably covered the Pleven and Balkan directions. Mehmet Ali's offensive was stopped. During the onslaught of Turkish troops on Byala, Osman Pasha tried on August 19 to go on the offensive towards Mehmet Ali in order to squeeze the Russians from both sides. But his strength was not enough, and he was repulsed. So, the August offensive of the Turks was repulsed, which allowed the Russians to resume active operations. Plevna became the main object of the onslaught.

The capture of Lovcha and the third assault on Plevna (1877). It was decided to start the Pleven operation with the capture of Lovcha (35 km south of Pleven). From here, the Turks threatened the Russian rear at Plevna and Shipka. On August 22, a detachment of Prince Imeretinsky (27 thousand people) attacked Lovcha. It was defended by an 8,000-strong garrison led by Rifat Pasha. The assault on the fortress lasted 12 hours. The detachment of General Mikhail Skobelev distinguished himself in it. Transferring his attack from the right flank to the left, he disorganized the Turkish defense and finally decided the outcome of a tense battle. The losses of the Turks amounted to 2.2 thousand people, the Russians - over 1.5 thousand people. The fall of Lovcha eliminated the threat to the southern rear of the Western Detachment and allowed the third assault on Plevna to begin. By that time, Plevna, well fortified by the Turks, the garrison of which had grown to 34,000, had become the central nerve of the war. Without taking the fortress, the Russians could not advance beyond the Balkans, as they experienced a constant threat of a flank attack from her side. The siege troops were brought up to 85 thousand people by the end of August. (including 32 thousand Romanians). The Romanian king Karol I took the overall command of them. The third assault took place on August 30-31. The Romanians, advancing from the east, took the Grivitsky redoubts. The detachment of General Skobelev, who led his soldiers to attack on a white horse, broke through close to the city from the southwestern side. Despite the deadly fire, Skobelev's soldiers captured two redoubts (Kavanlek and Issa-aga). The path to Plevna was open. Osman threw the last reserves against the broken parts. All day on August 31, a fierce battle was in full swing here. The Russian command had reserves (less than half of all battalions went on the assault), but Skobelev did not receive them. As a result, the Turks recaptured the redoubts. The remnants of the Skobel detachment had to retreat. The third assault on Plevna cost the Allies 16 thousand people. (of which over 12 thousand Russians.). It was the bloodiest battle for the Russians in all the previous Russian-Turkish wars. The Turks lost 3 thousand people. After this failure, the commander-in-chief, Nikolai Nikolayevich, offered to withdraw beyond the Danube. He was supported by a number of military leaders. However, Minister of War Milyutin spoke out strongly against it, saying that such a move would deal a huge blow to the prestige of Russia and its army. Emperor Alexander II agreed with Milyutin. It was decided to proceed to the blockade of Plevna. The blockade works were headed by the hero of Sevastopol Totleben.

Autumn Offensive of the Turks (1877). A new failure near Plevna forced the Russian command to abandon active operations and wait for reinforcements. The initiative again passed to the Turkish army. On September 5, Suleiman attacked Shipka again, but was repulsed. The Turks lost 2 thousand people, the Russians - 1 thousand. On September 9, the positions of the Eastern Detachment were attacked by the army of Mehmet-Ali. However, her entire offensive was reduced to an assault on the Russian positions at Chair-kioy. After a two-day battle, the Turkish army withdrew to its original positions. After that, Mehmet Ali was replaced by Suleiman Pasha. In general, the September offensive of the Turks was rather passive and did not cause any special complications. The energetic Suleiman Pasha, who took command, developed a plan for a new November offensive. It provided for a three-pronged onslaught. The army of Mehmet-Ali (35 thousand people) was supposed to advance from Sofia to Lovcha. The southern army, led by Wessel Pasha, was to take Shipka and move to Tarnovo. The main Eastern army of Suleiman Pasha attacked Elena and Tarnovo. The first attack was supposed to be on Lovcha. But Mehmet-Ali delayed the performance, and in a two-day battle near Novachin (November 10-11), Gurko's detachment defeated his advanced units. The Turkish attack on Shipka on the night of November 9 (in the area of ​​Mount St. Nicholas) was also repelled. After these unsuccessful attempts, the army of Suleiman Pasha went on the offensive. On November 14, Suleiman Pasha delivered a distracting blow to the left flank of the Eastern Detachment, and then went to his shock group (35 thousand people). It was intended for an attack on Elena in order to interrupt communication between the Eastern and Southern detachments of the Russians. On November 22, the Turks delivered a powerful blow to Elena and defeated the detachment of Svyatopolk-Mirsky 2nd (5 thousand people) stationed here.

The positions of the Eastern Detachment were broken through, and the way to Tarnovo, where there were large Russian warehouses, was opened. But Suleiman did not continue the offensive the next day, which allowed the heir to Tsarevich Alexander to transfer reinforcements here. They attacked the Turks and closed the gap. The capture of Elena was the last success of the Turkish army in this war. Then Suleiman again transferred the blow to the left flank of the Eastern Detachment. On November 30, 1877, a strike group of Turks (40 thousand people) attacked units of the Eastern Detachment (28 thousand people) near the village of Mechka. The main blow fell on the positions of the 12th Corps, commanded by Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich. After a fierce battle, the onslaught of the Turks was stopped. The Russians launched a counterattack and drove back those who were advancing behind Lom. The damage of the Turks amounted to 3 thousand people, the Russians - about 1 thousand people. For the Mechka, the heir Tsarevich Alexander received the St. George Star. In general, the Eastern Detachment had to hold back the main Turkish onslaught. In fulfilling this task, considerable merit belongs to the heir to the Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich, who showed undoubted military leadership talents in this war. Interestingly, he was a staunch opponent of wars and became famous for the fact that Russia never fought during his reign. Ruling the country, Alexander III showed military abilities not on the battlefield, but in the field of solid strengthening of the Russian armed forces. He believed that Russia needed two faithful allies for a quiet life - the army and the navy. The battle at Mechka was the last major attempt by the Turkish army to defeat the Russian troops in Bulgaria. At the end of this battle, the sad news came to the headquarters of Suleiman Pasha about the surrender of Plevna, which radically changed the situation on the Russian-Turkish front.

Siege and fall of Plevna (1877). Totleben, who led the siege of Plevna, strongly opposed the new assault. He considered the main thing to achieve a complete blockade of the fortress. To do this, it was necessary to cut the Sofia-Plevna road, along which the besieged garrison received reinforcements. The approaches to it were guarded by the Turkish redoubts Gorny Dubnyak, Dolny Dubnyak and Telish. To take them, a special detachment was formed led by General Gurko (22 thousand people). On October 12, 1877, after a powerful artillery preparation, the Russians attacked Gorny Dubnyak. It was defended by a garrison led by Ahmet-Khivzi Pasha (4.5 thousand people). The assault was distinguished by stubbornness and bloodshed. The Russians lost over 3.5 thousand people, the Turks - 3.8 thousand people. (including 2.3 thousand prisoners). At the same time, the Telish fortifications were attacked, which surrendered only 4 days later. About 5 thousand people were taken prisoner. After the fall of Gorny Dubnyak and Telish, the garrison of Dolny Dubnyak left their positions and retreated to Plevna, which was now completely blocked. By mid-November, the number of troops near Plevna exceeded 100 thousand people. against the 50,000th garrison, whose food supplies were running out. By the end of November, food in the fortress remained for 5 days. Under these conditions, Osman Pasha tried to break out of the fortress on November 28. The honor of repulsing this desperate onslaught belonged to the grenadiers of General Ivan Ganetsky. Having lost 6 thousand people, Osman Pasha surrendered. The fall of Plevna dramatically changed the situation. The Turks lost their 50,000 army, while the Russians had 100,000 men freed. for the offensive. The victory came at a high cost. The total Russian losses near Plevna amounted to 32 thousand people.

Shipka seat (1877). While Osman Pasha was still holding out at Plevna, on Shipka, the former southern point of the Russian front, the famous winter sitting began in November. Snow fell in the mountains, the passes were covered with snow, and severe frosts struck. It was during this period that the Russians suffered the most severe losses on Shipka. And not from bullets, but from a more terrible enemy - an icy cold. During the "sitting" period, the damage of the Russians amounted to: 700 people from fighting, 9.5 thousand people from diseases and frostbite. Thus, the 24th Division, sent to Shipka without warm boots and sheepskin coats, lost up to 2/3 of its composition (6.2 thousand people) from frostbite in two weeks. Despite exceptionally difficult conditions, Radetzky and his soldiers continued to hold the pass. The Shipka seat, which required extraordinary stamina from the Russian soldiers, ended with the start of the general offensive of the Russian army.

Balkan theater of operations

Third stage

By the end of the year, favorable conditions had developed in the Balkans for the Russian army to go on the offensive. Its number reached 314 thousand people. against 183 thousand people. at the Turks. In addition, the capture of Plevna and the victory at Mechka secured the flanks of the Russian troops. However, the onset of winter sharply reduced the possibility of offensive operations. The Balkans were already covered with deep snow, and at this time of the year they were considered impassable. Nevertheless, at the military council on November 30, 1877, it was decided to cross the Balkans in winter. Wintering in the mountains threatened the soldiers with death. But if the army left the passes for winter quarters, then in the spring the Balkan steeps would have to be stormed again. Therefore, it was decided to descend from the mountains, but in a different direction - to Constantinople. For this, several detachments were allocated, of which the two main ones were Western and Southern. The western one, led by Gurko (60 thousand people), was supposed to go to Sofia with a stop at the rear of the Turkish troops at Shipka. The southern detachment of Radetsky (over 40 thousand people) advanced in the Shipka area. Two more detachments led by Generals Kartsev (5 thousand people) and Dellingshausen (22 thousand people) advanced respectively through Trayanov Val and Tvarditsky Pass. A breakthrough in several places at once did not give the Turkish command the opportunity to concentrate its forces in any one direction. Thus began the most striking operation of this war. After almost half a year of trampling near Plevna, the Russians suddenly took off and decided the outcome of the campaign in just a month, stunning Europe and Turkey.

Battle of the Sheins (1877). South of the Shipka Pass, in the area of ​​the village of Sheinovo, was the Turkish army of Wessel Pasha (30-35 thousand people). Radetsky's plan was to double the coverage of the army of Wessel Pasha with columns of generals Skobelev (16.5 thousand people) and Svyatopolk-Mirsky (19 thousand people). They had to overcome the Balkan passes (Imitlisky and Tryavnensky), and then, having reached the Sheinovo region, inflict flank attacks on the Turkish army stationed there. Radetsky himself, with the units remaining on Shipka, dealt a distracting blow in the center. The winter crossing of the Balkans (often waist-deep in snow) in -20-degree frost was fraught with great risks. However, the Russians managed to overcome the snow-covered steeps. On December 27, the column of Svyatopolk-Mirsky was the first to reach Sheinovo. She immediately entered the battle and captured the front line of the Turkish fortifications. The right column of Skobelev was delayed with the exit. She had to overcome deep snow in harsh weather conditions, climbing along narrow mountain paths. Skobelev's delay gave the Turks a chance to defeat Svyatopolk-Mirsky's detachment. But their attacks on the morning of January 28 were repulsed. To help his own detachment Radetzky rushed from Shipka in a frontal attack on the Turks. This bold onslaught was repelled, but fettered part of the Turkish forces. Finally, having overcome the snowdrifts, Skobelev's units entered the battle area. They swiftly attacked the Turkish camp and broke into Sheinovo from the west. This onslaught decided the outcome of the battle. At 15:00, the surrounded Turkish troops capitulated. 22 thousand people surrendered to captivity. The losses of the Turks killed and wounded amounted to 1 thousand people. The Russians lost about 5 thousand people. The victory at Sheinovo ensured a breakthrough in the Balkans and opened the way for the Russians to Adrianople.

Battle of Philippoly (1878). Due to a snowstorm that broke out in the mountains, Gurko's detachment, moving in a detour, spent 8 days instead of the expected two. Local residents familiar with the mountains believed that the Russians were going to certain death. But they came, in the end, to victory. In the battles of December 19-20, advancing waist-deep in snow, Russian soldiers knocked down Turkish troops from their positions on the passes, then descended from the Balkans and occupied Sofia on December 23 without a fight. Further, at Philippopolis (now Plovdiv), there was the army of Suleiman Pasha (50 thousand people) transferred from eastern Bulgaria. This was the last major barrier on the way to Adrianople. On the night of January 3, the advanced Russian units forded the icy waters of the Maritsa River and entered into battle with the Turkish outposts west of the city. On January 4, Gurko's detachment continued the offensive and, bypassing Suleiman's army, cut off its retreat to the east, to Adrianople. On January 5, the Turkish army began to hastily retreat along the last free road to the south, towards the Aegean Sea. In the battles near Philippopolis, she lost 20 thousand people. (killed, wounded, captured, deserted) and ceased to exist as a serious combat unit. The Russians lost 1.2 thousand people. It was the last major battle of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. In the battles at Sheinovo and Philippopolis, the Russians defeated the main forces of the Turks beyond the Balkans. A significant role in the success of the winter campaign was played by the fact that the troops were led by the most capable military leaders - Gurko and Radetzky. On January 14-16, their detachments joined in Adrianople. It was the first to be occupied by the avant-garde, headed by the third brilliant hero of that war, General Skobelev. On January 19, 1878, a truce was concluded here, which drew a line under the history of Russian-Turkish military rivalry in South-Eastern Europe.

Caucasian theater of operations (1877-1878)

In the Caucasus, the forces of the parties were approximately equal. The Russian army under the general command of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolayevich numbered 100 thousand people. Turkish army under the command of Mukhtar Pasha - 90 thousand people. Russian forces were distributed as follows. In the west, the area of ​​the Black Sea coast was guarded by the Kobuleti detachment under the command of General Oklobzhio (25 thousand people). Further, in the Akhaltsikhe-Akhalkalaki region, the Akhaltsikhe detachment of General Devel (9 thousand people) was located. In the center, near Alexandropol, were the main forces led by General Loris-Melikov (50 thousand people). On the southern flank stood the Erivan detachment of General Tergukasov (11 thousand people). The last three detachments made up the Caucasian Corps, which was led by Loris-Melikov. The war in the Caucasus developed similarly to the Balkan scenario. First came the offensive of the Russian troops, then their transition to the defensive, and then a new offensive and inflicting a complete defeat on the enemy. On the day war was declared, the Caucasian Corps immediately went on the offensive with three detachments. The offensive took Mukhtar Pasha by surprise. He did not have time to deploy troops and retreated behind Kars to cover the Erzrum direction. Loris-Melikov did not pursue the Turks. Having united his main forces with the Akhaltsikhe detachment, the Russian commander began to lay siege to Kars. Forward, in the Erzrum direction, a detachment was sent under the command of General Geiman (19 thousand people). South of Kars, the Erivan detachment of Tergukasov advanced. He occupied Bayazet without a fight, and then moved along the Alashkert valley towards Erzrum. On June 9, near Dayar, the 7,000-strong detachment of Tergukasov was attacked by the 18,000-strong army of Mukhtar Pasha. Tergukasov fought off the onslaught and began to wait for the actions of his northern colleague - Geiman. He did not keep himself waiting long.

Battle of Zivin (1877). Retreat of the Erivan detachment (1877). On June 13, 1877, Geiman's detachment (19 thousand people) attacked the fortified positions of the Turks in the Zivina region (halfway from Kars to Erzrum). They were defended by the Turkish detachment of Khaki Pasha (10 thousand people). The poorly prepared assault on the Zivin fortifications (only a quarter of the Russian detachment was brought into battle) was repulsed. The Russians lost 844 people, the Turks - 540 people. The Zivin failure had serious consequences. After her, Loris-Melikov lifted the siege of Kars and ordered to start a retreat to the Russian border. The Erivan detachment, which had gone far deep into Turkish territory, had a particularly hard time. He had to make his way back through the sun-scorched valley, suffering from heat and lack of food. “At that time, camp kitchens did not exist,” recalled officer A.A. Brusilov, a participant in that war, “When the troops were on the move or without a wagon train, like us, the food was distributed from hand to hand, and everyone cooked what he could. Soldiers and officers suffered in the same way." In the rear of the Erivan detachment was the Turkish corps of Faik Pasha (10 thousand people), which besieged Bayazet. And from the front, the numerically superior Turkish army threatened. The successful completion of this difficult 200-kilometer retreat was greatly facilitated by the heroic defense of the Bayazet fortress.

Defense of Bayazet (1877). In this citadel there was a Russian garrison, which consisted of 32 officers and 1587 lower ranks. The siege began on 4 June. The assault on June 8 ended in failure for the Turks. Then Faik Pasha proceeded to blockade, hoping that hunger and heat would be better than his soldiers to cope with the besieged. But despite the lack of water, the Russian garrison rejected offers of surrender. By the end of June, the soldiers were given only one wooden spoon of water a day in the summer heat. The situation seemed so hopeless that the commandant of Bayazet, Lieutenant Colonel Patsevich, spoke at the military council in favor of surrender. But he was shot dead by officers outraged by such a proposal. The defense was led by Major Shtokvich. The garrison continued to stand firm, hoping for help. And the hopes of the bayazets were justified. On June 28, units of General Tergukasov arrived in time to help them, who fought their way to the fortress and saved its defenders. The loss of the garrison during the siege amounted to 7 officers and 310 lower ranks. The heroic defense of Bayazet did not allow the Turks to go to the rear of the troops of General Tergukasov and cut off their retreat to the Russian border.

Battle of the Alagia Heights (1877). After the Russians lifted the siege of Kars and retreated to the border, Mukhtar Pasha went on the offensive. However, he did not dare to give the Russian army a field battle, but took up heavily fortified positions on the Aladzhian heights, east of Kars, where he stood all August. Standing continued in September. Finally, on September 20, Loris-Melikov, who had concentrated a 56,000-strong strike force against Aladzhi, himself went on the offensive against the troops of Mukhtar Pasha (38,000 people). The fierce battle lasted three days (until September 22) and ended in complete failure for Loris-Melikov. Having lost over 3 thousand people. in bloody frontal attacks, the Russians withdrew to their original lines. Despite his success, Mukhtar Pasha nevertheless decided to retreat to Kars on the eve of winter. As soon as the departure of the Turks was indicated, Loris-Melikov launched a second attack (October 2-3). This onslaught, which combined a frontal attack with a flank bypass, was crowned with success. The Turkish army suffered a crushing defeat and lost more than half of its composition (killed, wounded, captured, deserted). Its remnants retreated in disarray to Kars and then to Erzrum. The Russians lost 1,500 men during the second assault. The battle of Aladzhia became decisive in the Caucasian theater of operations. After this victory, the initiative completely passed to the Russian army. In the battle of Aladzha, the Russians made extensive use of the telegraph to control their troops for the first time. |^

Battle of Virgo-Bonnu (1877). After the defeat of the Turks on the Aladzhian heights, the Russians again laid siege to Kare. Forward, to Erzrum, Geiman's detachment was again sent. But this time Mukhtar Pasha did not linger on the Zivin positions, but retreated further to the west. On October 15, he joined near the town of Kepri-Key with the corps of Ishmael Pasha, who had previously acted against the Erivan detachment of Tergukasov, retreating from the Russian border. Now the forces of Mukhtar Pasha have increased to 20 thousand people. Following Ishmael's corps, the detachment of Tergukasov moved, which on October 21 joined with the detachment of Geiman, who led the combined forces (25 thousand people). Two days later, in the vicinity of Erzrum, near Deve Boinu, Geiman attacked the army of Mukhtar Pasha. Geiman began a demonstration of an attack on the right flank of the Turks, where Mukhtar Pasha transferred all the reserves. Meanwhile, Tergukasov decisively attacked the left flank of the Turks and inflicted a severe defeat on their army. Russian losses amounted to just over 600 people. The Turks lost b thousand people. (of which 3 thousand prisoners). After that, the way to Erzrum was opened. However, Geiman stood idle for three days and only on October 27 approached the fortress. This allowed Mukhtar Pasha to strengthen himself and put his disorderly units in order. The assault on October 28 was repulsed, which forced Geiman to move away from the fortress. In the conditions of the onset of cold weather, he withdrew his troops for the winter in the Passinskaya Valley.

The Capture of Kars (1877). While Geiman and Tergukasov were going to Erzrum, Russian troops besieged Kars on October 9, 1877. The siege corps was led by General Lazarev. (32 thousand people). The fortress was defended by a 25,000-strong Turkish garrison led by Hussein Pasha. The assault was preceded by the bombing of the fortifications, which lasted intermittently for 8 days. On the night of November 6, Russian detachments went on an attack, which ended with the capture of the fortress. General Lazarev himself played an important role in the assault. He led a detachment that captured the eastern forts of the fortress and repulsed the counterattack of Hussein Pasha's units. The Turks lost 3 thousand killed and 5 thousand wounded. 17 thousand people were taken prisoner. Russian losses during the assault exceeded 2 thousand people. The capture of Kars actually ended the war in the Caucasian theater of operations.

Peace of San Stefano and Congress of Berlin (1878)

Peace of San Stefano (1878). On February 19, 1878, a peace treaty was concluded in San Stefano (near Constantinople), which ended the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Russia received back from Romania the southern part of Bessarabia, lost after the Crimean War, and from Turkey the port of Batum, the Kars region, the city of Bayazet and the Alashkert valley. Romania took away the region of Dobruja from Turkey. The complete independence of Serbia and Montenegro was established with the provision of a number of territories to them. The main result of the treaty was the emergence in the Balkans of a new large and virtually independent state - the Bulgarian principality.

Berlin Congress (1878). The terms of the treaty provoked protests from England and Austria-Hungary. The threat of a new war forced Petersburg to revise the San Stefano Treaty. In the same 1878, the Congress of Berlin was convened, at which the leading powers changed the previous version of the territorial structure in the Balkans and Eastern Turkey. The acquisitions of Serbia and Montenegro were reduced, the area of ​​the Bulgarian Principality was cut almost three times. Austria-Hungary occupied Turkish possessions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From its acquisitions in Eastern Turkey, Russia returned the Alashkert valley and the city of Bayazet. Thus, the Russian side had, in general, to return to the variant of the territorial structure, agreed before the war with Austria-Hungary.

Despite the Berlin restrictions, Russia nevertheless regained the lands lost under the Treaty of Paris (with the exception of the mouth of the Danube), and achieved the implementation (although far from being in full) of the Balkan strategy of Nicholas I. This Russo-Turkish clash completes Russia's fulfillment of its lofty mission to liberate the Orthodox peoples from the oppression of the Turks. As a result of the age-old struggle of Russia for the Danube, Romania, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria gained independence. The Berlin Congress led to the gradual formation of a new alignment of forces in Europe. Russo-German relations cooled noticeably. On the other hand, the Austro-German alliance strengthened, in which there was no longer a place for Russia. Its traditional focus on Germany was coming to an end. In the 80s. Germany forms a military-political alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy. Berlin's hostility is pushing St. Petersburg into partnership with France, which, fearing a new German aggression, is now actively seeking Russian support. In 1892-1894. a military-political Franco-Russian alliance is formed. He became the main counterbalance to the "Triple Alliance" (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy). These two blocs determined the new balance of power in Europe. Another important consequence of the Berlin Congress was the weakening of Russia's prestige in the countries of the Balkan region. The Congress in Berlin dispelled the Slavophile dreams of uniting the South Slavs into an alliance headed by the Russian Empire.

The death toll in the Russian army was 105 thousand people. As in the previous Russian-Turkish wars, the main damage was caused by diseases (primarily typhus) - 82 thousand people. 75% of military losses were in the Balkan theater of operations.

Shefov N.A. The most famous wars and battles of Russia M. "Veche", 2000.
"From Ancient Russia to the Russian Empire". Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.

From the memoirs of Feoktistov E.M. (writer)

At first, despair took possession of Joseph Vladimirovich, when it became known that the guard would not take part in hostilities; he could not come to terms with this thought, cursed his fate ... The location that the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich showed him, Gurko was obliged by the fact that he was called to the theater of war. Having received news of this, he used no more than a day and flew to the army in the field ...

For people who knew closely, there was not the slightest doubt that a brilliant future awaited him there.

Belief in his star was based on the fact that, by his nature, Iosif Vladimirovich represented a rare exception in our society: if he was convinced of anything, he did not hesitate for a minute to take full responsibility for his orders and actions; if he set himself on some goal, he went towards it with inexorable perseverance; if he considered something just and necessary, he expressed his opinion and insisted on it, not paying any attention to whether it was liked in higher spheres or not.

His iron will and energy not bothered by any obstacles. Such characters are generally rare among us, and at that time and under the then regime they seemed to be something completely unusual ...

In the opinion of the majority of the public Skobelev was surrounded by a much more brilliant halo than Gurko... It was a demonic nature, equally capable of good and evil; in society, a man, apparently modest, but who amazed his friends with the most ugly depravity; ready to sacrifice his life on the battlefield, but, like a dexterous actor, always counting on the effect; above all, he valued popularity, and no one knew how to acquire it so skillfully as he did; not without reason D.A. Milyutin called him an extraordinarily gifted condottiere.

The sharpest contrast to Skobelev was Gurko, who placed duty above all else and, fulfilling it, did not care at all about what opinion would be formed about him. Such purely puritanical natures, devoid of external brilliance, do not impress the crowd.

From the diary of Gazenkampf M.A.

in the guard complain about the sharpness and coolness of Gurko. I personally positively know that the majority of the guards authorities cannot forgive Gurko for his rapid rise, cannot forget that six months ago he was only the head of the guards division, and now he has become one of his recent comrades domineering and strict boss, which keeps everyone in fear and requires unquestioning obedience.

Of course, they cannot forgive him even for the speech he made before the meeting of all the chiefs of the individual units of the guard troops, at the beginning of the campaign from Plevna to the Balkans, it seems - in Osikov. I was told about this event like this. Having ordered all the guards to gather, Gurko went out and said to them the following formidable words: “It has come to my attention that some of you, gentlemen, allow themselves to condemn me and my orders, not embarrassed by the presence of subordinates and even at lower ranks.

I have gathered you in order to remind you that I have been put in charge of you by the will of the Sovereign Emperor and only he, the fatherland and history owe an account of my actions. From you I demand unquestioning obedience and I will be able to force everyone and everyone to exactly fulfill, and not criticize my orders. I ask you all to keep this in mind. And now the official conversation is over, and I leave each of you to freely express who is dissatisfied with what. If I'm wrong about something, I'm ready to get better."

Then, turning to the senior in the rank of Count Shuvalov, Gurko asked:
"Your Excellency, what do you have to say?"
“Nothing,” answered the count, “I have no displeasures.
- And you? - Gurko turned to the next senior general.
“I’m fine, Your Excellency, I just said it was difficult…”
- Difficult? Gurko interrupted him, “so if it’s hard for big people, I’ll put them in reserve, and I’ll go ahead with the little ones.”

After that, Gurko himself did not ask anyone else, and thus this memorable conversation ended. Of course, silence and murmuring. But, of course, no one forgot or forgave this, especially since both before and after this conversation, Gurko never hesitated to sharply scold top officials in those cases when they were worth it.

"White General" Skobelev M.D.

From the memoirs of Vereshchagin V.V. (battle painter)

I found Skobelev on the descent talking with Prince Vyazemsky, the head of the Bulgarian militia brigade, if I am not mistaken, who had come to report that it was impossible to drag even one gun along this hellish road. Skobelev did not insist more, but I regretted it; if Gurko had it, he would have ordered to carry it "by all means", and, probably, at least two guns would have been dragged.

I remember how, near Etropol, my friend General Dandeville let Gurko know that “there is no possibility to drag the guns to the heights, as ordered,” to which he received a laconic answer: "pull in teeth"- and the guns were dragged, however, not by teeth, but by oxen ...

From the notes of Kuropatkin A.N. (chief of headquarters of the division Skobeleva M.D.)

An exceptional position in the troops gathered near Plevna, Skobelev, above all, deserved concern for the troops. He fed them even in a hot battle. While other commanders from the beginning of the battle sent the kitchens of their units as far as possible, in fear that they would fall into the hands of the enemy during the retreat, Skobelev thought, first of all, about ensuring victory, on the contrary, he may have advanced the kitchens to the battle lines, demanded that food be boiled continuously and demanded that pots of hot food be brought even to the front lines.

It is hard to imagine what a calming, invigorating impression on the troops the appearance of a company cart with boilers filled with hot food, or barrels of water, made on the position. Tired, with already torn nerves, the fighters came to life and not so much from joy that they would satisfy their hunger, but from the consciousness that they were taken care of, that they were not forgotten. Let us add that Skobelev knew how to appear precisely at such moments and with an asque word, a joke, caring participation still strengthened the favorable impression on the troops of his orders.

Before the battle, the troops saw Skobelev in a tireless care in preparing for the success of the battle. They saw that at night there was no rest at Skobelev's headquarters. On the day of the battle, Skobelev seemed to the troops especially joyful, cheerful, handsome every time. When making a detour of the troops, Skobelev was, as it were, the personification of the wars. Soldiers and officers cheerfully and with confidence looked at his martial handsome figure, admired him, joyfully greeted him and from the bottom of their hearts answered him “glad to try” to his wish that they be great in the upcoming business.

Meeting with units with which he was already in business, Skobelev was able to recall their common military past in a few words. We can boldly testify that every unit that was once in business with Skobelev considered him forever as his own boss, was always proud of his military connection with him.

Speaking before the battle with the troops, Skobelev took the opportunity to indicate what was the task of each unit. The chiefs of the units, according to their dignity, were instructed not only about what they should do, but also how to do it. In those cases when Skobelev dealt with a boss he trusted, these instructions were very brief and usually ended with a statement that such a boss himself knew better than he how to complete the task.

With the beginning of the battle, Skobelev usually followed with advanced troops to the point where it was best for him to direct the battle and, as far as possible in the difficult situation of modern combat, actually led it, using reserves for this and becoming the head of the troops personally where there were not enough reserves and where, in the course of the battle, he considered it necessary personal example.

But all these qualities would not have made Skobelev a favorite of the troops and a folk hero if he had not possessed a mysterious gift to a high degree. influence the weight, to subordinate her to his power and inspire her with spontaneous love and trust. With this high gift, Skobelev stood out from a number of ordinary bosses, and this gift was mainly the reason for his extraordinary popularity.

Only thanks to such a gift, the appearance of Skobelev in the most difficult moments of the battle did not go unnoticed by the troops. Those who retreated returned, those who lay down got up and followed him to death ... This sacred and mysterious gift - to influence the masses and convey their determination to them - created such a strong connection between the troops and Skobelev that nothing was impossible for them, nothing was lost, until he doubted in success himself Skobelev.

This connection alone can explain the extraordinary stubbornness with which our troops under the command of Skobelev fought and died at Plevna and in other battles. At the end of the battle, Skobelev, in caring for the wounded, in the arrangement of units that were in action, again set an example to follow. We add, finally, that Skobelev in his reports never belittled the merits of his subordinates and sometimes even attributed to them what was done by himself.

From the memoirs of J. Adam (French writer)

For all of Russia, he was "hero of Plevna". Here is how, in 1878, Mr. Forbes describes Skobelev: “Soldiers, townspeople, women - everyone was crazy about him. I now see his beautiful forehead, adorned with chestnut hair; his blue eyes, bright, with a penetrating look that looked so openly and directly at you; .. his courageous, energetic face, bordered by a silky beard that fell on his heroic chest ...

This man at thirty-three saw everything, did everything, read everything ... He was musician, and one evening he sang to Mac Gahan and me, in a beautiful voice, accompanying himself on the piano, French songs, and then German, Russian, Italian and Kirghiz ... Saying goodbye to him, I said to myself that I saw that evening a lovely example of Russian perfection, or , or rather, cosmopolitan, I managed to meet any. And I did not see him in his real sphere - on the battlefield.

The commander on the march, the hero in the fire of battle, "a man of science", as he said in his office, Skobelev left many wonderful works: military stories, reports on the state of the troops, notes and observations, etc. His invincibility, the influence that he had on people, the inner strength that he possessed, made him a demigod. It was Achilles, who knew how to control himself. His personality, ... appearance, character, actions, embodied the idea that they make for themselves about the god of war ... Skobelev was and will remain a hero of Russia.

General Totleben E.I.

From the memoirs of Voronov I.A.

Totleben... did not tolerate objections or other people's opinions, even if they were fair, efficient and appropriate; in this respect, subordinates experienced a painful state. However, those who knew Eduard Ivanovich’s character and his weaknesses closely answered his orders with the affirmative “I listen and execute,” and meanwhile, if these orders ran counter to the case, projects, assumptions, calculations, etc., were drawn up, in accordance with the actual requirements and in accordance with scientific data. Then, during the reports ... it was explained to him what and how and why it was done this way and not otherwise, and the count was almost always satisfied if the reported case was executed or proposed for execution correctly and thoroughly.

The fortresses of Kerch and Ochakov, as new, Bendery, the Warsaw citadel, Kyiv, Novogeorgievsk, Brest-Litovsk, Vyborg, Sveaborg, Kronstadt, etc., as having received strengthening and some kind of restructuring, can truly serve as visible witnesses tirelessly useful engineering activity Totleben.

During the last Turkish campaign, Count Totleben ... since the announcement of mobilization for two months (October and November 1876) created formidable strongholds from nothing to protect the long-suffering Sevastopol with its world bay and cosmopolitan Odessa with its bankers and various offices. The capture of Plevna and the columns of the army of Osman Pasha constitute the crown of Totleben's military activity. In a word, wherever Totleben appeared to defend the fatherland, real obstacles to the enemy and a reliable stronghold for the defenders grew everywhere.

From the notes of Mikheev S.P.

Radetzky Fedor Fedorovich was born in 1820. Soon after completing the course at the engineering school, he transferred to the Caucasus, from where he entered the military academy and graduated from it in the 1st category, after the Hungarian war he again transferred to the Caucasian army. His service in the Caucasus is a series of military distinctions, especially when he commanded the Dagestan Infantry Regiment.

During the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, commanding the 8th Army Corps, he led the crossing over the Danube, and then occupied the Shipka Pass and held it until December 29. The position of the defenders of Shipka and their valiant commander was difficult, who, with insignificant forces, had to hold back the energetic offensive and attacks of the army of Suleiman Pasha.

These attacks (from 9 to 14 August) differed stubborn perseverance and they were so strong that, for example, on August 12, Radetzky himself had to stand in front of the troops and personally lead them with hostility. However, the matter did not end with the repulsion of the August attacks: it was necessary to keep Shipka at all costs. A harsh winter came and Radetzky had a difficult lot to fight with the enemy and nature. Parts of the 8th Corps were in such a difficult situation for 5 months.

Under the general leadership of Radetsky, the winter crossing through the Balkans was completed and the army of Wessel Pasha was captured ... For this operation, Radetsky was awarded the Order George 2nd degree. After the end of the war, his name became extremely popular: he was met everywhere and honored as a national hero. In 1882, Fedor Fedorovich was appointed commander of the Kharkov military district, and after the abolition of the latter, he moved to Kyiv. The name of Radetzky, the valiant hero of the Caucasus, the Danube and Shipka, will forever be dear to every Russian heart.

A deep sense of proportion, unshakable determination in achieving a goal once set, indifference to danger, which has a calming effect on those around him in the most critical moments of a combat situation, justice, constant concern for a soldier, extreme modesty, simplicity and softness of heart - these are the features of this purely Russian nature, so charmingly acting on the troops subordinate to him. In general, he belonged to the number of those "fathers-commanders" who are recognized by a sensitive soldier's heart, wholly and wholeheartedly surrendering to his beloved commanders.

From the memoirs of V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko

Radetsky is a type of military general. Despite the strict facial features, they have an expression great kindness, a look as if looking out for something in the distance, somewhat frowning gray eyebrows, a direct setting of a seemingly strong body, in spite of years, a strong arm and strong legs. He definitely grows to the saddle when he sits on a horse. From the 12th to the 20th of August, he does not come out of the fire, showing himself on horseback where all the others prudently lie down behind the lodgements. On August 12, having sent all his troops to the attack, Radetzky remained with one company. Finally, she was needed. The general led her himself.
- I have no one to stay with - let's go together, guys.

The soldiers answered him with such a heartfelt "hurrah", which is rarely heard by parade generals. Radetsky is famous for his gentleness and kindness, which is somewhat contradicted by his appearance. He passionately loves the soldier and is selflessly loved by him.

Immediately after the end of the battle, General Radetzky set off for reconnaissance. It was already night. The tops of the mountains floated vaguely in the mist; the path illuminated by the moon, lying in capricious meanders along the ridges, seemed like a silver river ... Only it stood out distinctly ... Ours finally focused on the positions of St. Nicholas (Mount St. Nicholas - the highest point of the Shipka Pass) and the Green Tree (village). The rest is given to the Turks, because the extended battle line cannot be defended by the forces that are at Radetzky. Any offensive by the Turks on our positions will be repulsed. We will only defend...

General Dragomirov M.I.

From the notes of Mikheev S.P.

Dragomirov Mikhail Ivanovich was born in 1830; in 1849 he was promoted to officer in the Life Guards Semenovsky Regiment. He graduated from the Academy of the General Staff with a gold medal and subsequently was its chief and an outstanding professor. His lectures on relief and vitality of presentation have always attracted the attention of his many students. The simplicity of his speech, its pithiness, figurative presentation, sincerity and wit captured the attention of his listeners.

Mikhail Ivanovich was an ardent admirer of the Suvorov tactics. The dominance of spirit over matter is the main idea of ​​Dragomirov's teachings. He devoted his whole life to carrying this idea into the life of the army. Using his mighty talent and power, inspired by his love for military affairs, he tirelessly preached this idea in his writings, which are a precious contribution to military literature (his writings have been translated into all European languages).

Love for a soldier, reaching to adoration, runs like a red thread through all his activities. With a sensitive heart, comprehending his simple worldview, he set out to educate a soldier as a valiant defender of the motherland, not only for fear, but for conscience. Most of all, he sought to develop in the lower ranks courage, steadfastness and strong unshakable confidence in the need to come to terms with the enemy chest to chest at all costs in order to win or die. There can be no middle solution in this matter.

Not only in this regard Dragomirov M.I. was a direct follower and student of Suvorov. Like the last one, he demanded from the soldier reasonable attitude to military affairs, but from the officer of the proper education of subordinates, by no means allowing the drill that turned the soldiers into machine guns.

Knowing how difficult it is for a commoner to memorize and how useless unconscious memorization is, Dragomirov demanded simplicity and clarity in teaching, limiting it only to what a soldier would need to know in the war, and the method of instruction indicated a show, not a story. Mikhail Ivanovich put his vast theoretical knowledge into practice during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. when, leading the crossing across the Danube, he brilliantly completed this difficult task.

Stoletov N.G.

From the memoirs of Gilyarovsky V.A. (journalist, memoirist and prose writer)

From morning to night, the wardroom of the steamer "Petersburg" is lively. More and more new faces arrive, all generals, staff officers, and only occasionally chief officers. Many flaunt white crosses - signs of selfless courage, others - golden weapons, and almost everyone - orders with swords, and venerable, expensive medals with a modest inscription: "not to us, not to us, but to Your name" ...

Leaning on board, stands one of the oldest heroes of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. - General Stoletov N.G. There are two white crosses on his chest: Georgy soldier 4th degree and George officer 4th degree. Rare combination!

And all the more rare that he received the soldier George after graduating from Moscow University, in Sevastopol, in the Crimean campaign, on the famous 4th bastion and in the Inkerman battles. Then the young St. George Knight was promoted to officer after his new distinction. In the Turkish campaign of 1877, Stoletov commanded the Bulgarian squads and speaks with enthusiasm about this selflessly brave, intelligent army ... He is proud of them, especially the 4th, 1st, 3rd and 5th squads .

From the book “Russian-Turkish war. Forgotten and unknown”, comp. Vorobieva N.N., Kharkov, “Folio”, 2013, p. 241-263.

1. Russo-Turkish War

   The Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 is a war between the Russian Empire and its allied Balkan states on the one hand and the Ottoman Empire on the other. It was caused by the rise of national consciousness in the Balkans. The brutality with which the April Uprising was crushed in Bulgaria aroused sympathy for the position of the Christians of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and especially in Russia. Attempts to improve the position of Christians by peaceful means were frustrated by the stubborn unwillingness of the Turks to make concessions to Europe, and in April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey.
   In the course of the ensuing hostilities, the Russian army managed, using the passivity of the Turks, to successfully cross the Danube, capture the Shipka Pass and, after a five-month siege, force Osman Pasha's best Turkish army to surrender at Plevna. The subsequent raid through the Balkans, during which the Russian army defeated the last Turkish units blocking the road to Constantinople, led to the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the war. At the Berlin Congress held in the summer of 1878, the Berlin Treaty was signed, which fixed the return of the southern part of Bessarabia to Russia and the annexation of Kars, Ardagan and Batumi. The statehood of Bulgaria was restored (it was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1396) as a vassal Principality of Bulgaria; the territories of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania increased, and the Turkish Bosnia and Herzegovina was occupied by Austria-Hungary.

   Russia returned the southern part of Bessarabia, lost after the Crimean War, and annexed the Kars region, inhabited by Armenians and Georgians.
   Great Britain occupied Cyprus; according to an agreement with the Ottoman Empire dated June 4, 1878, in exchange for this, she undertook to protect Turkey from further Russian advances in the Transcaucasus. The occupation of Cyprus was to last as long as Kars and Batumi remained in Russian hands.
   The borders established at the end of the war remained in force until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, with some changes:
   Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia merged into a single principality in 1885;
   In 1908, Bulgaria declared itself a kingdom independent of Turkey, and Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it had previously occupied.
   The war marked the gradual withdrawal of Great Britain from confrontation in relations with Russia. After the fall of the Suez Canal to British control in 1875, the British desire to prevent further weakening of Turkey at all costs began to wane. British policy switched to protecting British interests in Egypt, which was occupied by Britain in 1882 and remained a British protectorate until 1922. The British advance in Egypt did not directly affect the interests of Russia, and, accordingly, the tension in relations between the two countries gradually weakened.
   The transition to a military alliance became possible after the conclusion in 1907 of a compromise on Central Asia, formalized by the Anglo-Russian Treaty of August 31, 1907. From this date, the emergence of the Entente is counted - the Anglo-French-Russian coalition opposing the German-led alliance of the Central Powers. The opposition of these blocs led to the First World War of 1914-1918.

   After the outbreak of the war, Romania took the side of Russia, letting the Russian troops through its territory. By the beginning of June 1877, the Russian army, led by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (185 thousand people), concentrated on the left bank of the Danube. She was opposed by approximately equal in number of troops under the command of Abdul-Kerim Pasha. Most of them were located in the already indicated quadrangle of fortresses. The main forces of the Russian army concentrated somewhat to the west, near Zimnitsa. The main crossing over the Danube was being prepared there. Even further west, along the river, from Nikopol to Vidin, the Romanian troops (45 thousand people) were located. In terms of combat training, the Russian army was superior to the Turkish. But in terms of the quality of weapons, the Turks surpassed the Russians. In particular, they were armed with the latest American and British rifles. The Turkish infantry had more ammunition and trench tools. Russian soldiers had to save shots. An infantryman who used up more than 30 rounds of ammunition (more than half of the cartridge bag) during the battle was threatened with punishment. A strong spring flood of the Danube prevented the crossing. In addition, the Turks had up to 20 battleships on the river that controlled the coastal zone. April and May passed in the fight against them. In the end, Russian troops, with the help of coastal batteries and mine boats, inflicted damage on the Turkish squadron and forced it to take refuge in Silistria. It was only after this that the opportunity for the crossing arose. On June 10, units of the XIV Corps of General Zimmermann crossed the river near Galati. They occupied Northern Dobruja, where they stayed idle until the end of the war. It was a distraction. Meanwhile, the main forces secretly accumulated near Zimnitsa. Opposite it, on the right bank, lay the fortified Turkish point of Sistovo.

   Crossing at Sistovo (1877). On the night of June 15, between Zimnitsa and Sistovo, the 14th division of General Mikhail Dragomirov crossed the river. Soldiers crossed in black winter uniforms to remain unnoticed in the dark. The first to land on the right bank without a single shot was the 3rd Volyn company, led by Captain Fok. The following units crossed the river already under heavy fire and immediately went into battle. After a fierce assault, the Sist fortifications fell. Russian losses during the crossing amounted to 1.1 thousand people. (killed, wounded and drowned). By June 21, 1877, sappers built a floating bridge near Sistovo, along which the Russian army crossed to the right bank of the Danube. The next plan was as follows. An advanced detachment under the command of General Iosif Gurko (12 thousand people) was intended for an offensive through the Balkans. To ensure the flanks, two detachments were created - the Eastern (40 thousand people) and the Western (35 thousand people). The eastern detachment, led by the heir Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich (future Emperor Alexander III), held back the main Turkish troops from the east (from the side of the fortress quadrangle). The western detachment, led by General Nikolai Kridiger, had the goal of expanding the invasion zone in a westerly direction.

   The capture of Nikopol and the first assault on Plevna (1877). Carrying out the assigned task, on July 3, Kridiger attacked Nikopol, which was defended by a 7,000-strong Turkish garrison. After a two-day assault, the Turks capitulated. Russian losses during the attack amounted to about 1.3 thousand people. The fall of Nikopol reduced the threat of a flank attack on the Russian crossings at Sistovo. On the western flank, the Turks had the last large detachment in the Vidin fortress. It was commanded by Osman Pasha, who managed to change the initial stage of the war, which was favorable for the Russians. Osman Pasha did not wait in Vidin for further actions by Kridiger. Taking advantage of the passivity of the Romanian army on the right flank of the allied forces, the Turkish commander left Vidin on July 1 and moved towards the Western detachment of the Russians. Overcoming 200 km in 6 days. Osman Pasha took up defense with a 17,000-strong detachment in the Plevna region. This decisive maneuver came as a complete surprise to Kridiger, who, after the capture of Nikopol, decided that the Turks were finished in this area. Therefore, the Russian commander was inactive for two days, instead of immediately taking possession of Plevna. By the time he woke up, it was already too late. Danger loomed over the right flank of the Russians and over their crossing (Plevna was 60 km from Sistovo). As a result of the occupation of Plevna by the Turks, the corridor for the offensive of Russian troops in the southern direction narrowed to 100-125 km (from Plevna to Ruschuk). Kridiger decided to rectify the situation and immediately sent the 5th division of General Schilder-Schulder (9 thousand people) against Plevna. However, the allocated forces were not enough, and the assault on Plevna on July 8 ended in failure. Having lost about a third of his forces during the attack, Schilder-Schulder was forced to retreat. The damage of the Turks amounted to 2 thousand people. This failure influenced the actions of the Eastern Detachment. He abandoned the blockade of the Rushuk fortress and went on the defensive, since the reserves for his reinforcement were now transferred to Plevna.

   Gurko's first Trans-Balkan campaign (1877). While the Eastern and Western detachments were settling in on the Sistov patch, parts of General Gurko quickly moved south to the Balkans. On June 25, the Russians occupied Tarnovo, and on July 2 they crossed the Balkans through the Heineken Pass. To the right, through the Shipka Pass, a Russian-Bulgarian detachment led by General Nikolai Stoletov (about 5 thousand people) advanced. On July 5-6, he attacked Shipka, but was repulsed. However, on July 7, the Turks, having learned about the capture of the Heineken Pass and the movement to the rear of Gurko's units, left Shipka. The way through the Balkans was open. Russian regiments and detachments of Bulgarian volunteers descended into the Rose Valley, enthusiastically received by the local population. The message of the Russian tsar to the Bulgarian people also contained the following words: “Bolgars, my troops have crossed the Danube, where they have fought more than once to alleviate the plight of the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula ... The task of Russia is to create, not to destroy. appease all nationalities and all confessions in those parts of Bulgaria where people of different origins and different faiths live together ... ". Advanced Russian units appeared 50 km from Adrianople. But this was the end of Gurko's promotion. He did not have enough forces for a successful massive offensive that could decide the outcome of the war. The Turkish command had reserves to repel this bold, but largely improvised onslaught. To protect this direction, the corps of Suleiman Pasha (20 thousand people) was transferred by sea from Montenegro, which closed the road to Gurko's units on the Eski-Zagra - Yeni-Zagra line. In fierce battles on July 18-19, Gurko, who did not receive sufficient reinforcements, managed to defeat the Turkish division of Reuf Pasha near Yeni-Zagra, but suffered a heavy defeat near Eski-Zagra, where the Bulgarian militia was defeated. Gurko's detachment retreated to the passes. This was the end of the First Trans-Balkan Campaign.

   The second assault on Plevna (1877). On the day when Gurko's divisions fought under two Zagrams, General Kridiger with a 26,000-strong detachment undertook a second assault on Plevna (July 18). By that time, its garrison had reached 24 thousand people. Thanks to the efforts of Osman Pasha and the talented engineer Teutik Pasha, Plevna turned into a formidable stronghold surrounded by defensive fortifications and redoubts. The scattered frontal onslaught of the Russians from the east and south crashed against the powerful Turkish defense system. Having lost more than 7 thousand people in fruitless attacks, Kridiger's troops retreated. The Turks lost about 4 thousand people. Panic erupted at the Sistov crossing at the news of this defeat. The approaching detachment of Cossacks was mistaken for the Turkish vanguard of Osman Pasha. There was a shootout. But Osman Pasha did not attack Sistovo. He limited himself to an onslaught in a southerly direction and the occupation of Lovcha, hoping from here to come into contact with the troops of Suleiman Pasha advancing from the Balkans. The second Plevna, along with the defeat of the Gurko detachment at Eski-Zagra, forced the Russian troops to go on the defensive in the Balkans. The Guards Corps was called from St. Petersburg to the Balkans.

   Siege and fall of Plevna (1877). Totleben, who led the siege of Plevna, strongly opposed the new assault. He considered the main thing to achieve a complete blockade of the fortress. To do this, it was necessary to cut the Sofia-Plevna road, along which the besieged garrison received reinforcements. The approaches to it were guarded by the Turkish redoubts Gorny Dubnyak, Dolny Dubnyak and Telish. To take them, a special detachment was formed led by General Gurko (22 thousand people). On October 12, 1877, after a powerful artillery preparation, the Russians attacked Gorny Dubnyak. It was defended by a garrison led by Ahmet-Khivzi Pasha (4.5 thousand people). The assault was distinguished by stubbornness and bloodshed. The Russians lost over 3.5 thousand people, the Turks - 3.8 thousand people. (including 2.3 thousand prisoners). At the same time, the Telish fortifications were attacked, which surrendered only 4 days later. About 5 thousand people were taken prisoner. After the fall of Gorny Dubnyak and Telish, the garrison of Dolny Dubnyak left their positions and retreated to Plevna, which was now completely blocked. By mid-November, the number of troops near Plevna exceeded 100 thousand people. against the 50,000th garrison, whose food supplies were running out. By the end of November, food in the fortress remained for 5 days. Under these conditions, Osman Pasha tried to break out of the fortress on November 28. The honor of repulsing this desperate onslaught belonged to the grenadiers of General Ivan Ganetsky. Having lost 6 thousand people, Osman Pasha surrendered. The fall of Plevna dramatically changed the situation. The Turks lost their 50,000 army, while the Russians had 100,000 men freed. for the offensive. The victory came at a high price. The total Russian losses near Plevna amounted to 32 thousand people. It was the bloodiest battle of the entire war.

2. The next important strategic task of the Russian army was to cross the Balkan Mountains, which, in the conditions of the onset of winter, was considered by many to be completely reckless. On the morning of December 13, General Gurko set out for the Balkans in three columns, and after an incredibly difficult campaign through the snowy mountains, along icy paths, in severe frost and blizzard, dragging 4-pounder guns on his shoulders, the vanguard of the western detachment took possession of the exits from the Balkans, and the cavalry stood up already on the Sofia highway. The enemy was taken by surprise, due to which the Russian troops lost only 5 people. The Grand Duke immediately telegraphed the emperor about this joyful news. On December 21, it was received from I.V. Gurko’s report on the final crossing through the Balkans. This news brought great joy to the Grand Duke, since the new success of our troops gave him a chance for a glorious end to the campaign, for which court circles, the press, and after it a significant part of Russian society blamed the Grand Duke. crossing the Balkans, followed by other victories, and on December 24 - the capture of Sofia, the end of the entire war was approaching. The Grand Duke was even more worried about the situation of the detachment of General Radetzky, who was to act on Shipka in a very difficult mountainous situation, and he was also worried about the extreme insecurity of the troops the most necessary clothing, about which he sent a telegram to the Minister of War: “The Guards troops were left at this moment - as well as officers and lower ranks - without boots for a long time, and now, completely without trousers. Uniforms and greatcoats - only rags and then without a lint. Most of them have no underwear, and those who have left are in tatters and decayed. I earnestly request the immediate deportation of all kinds of clothing and footwear for the Guard. Even the Turkish attire, found and issued to officers and people, has already been torn apart during the incredibly difficult and gigantic work of crossing the Balkans. Please notify me of the orders you have made. Give me this present for the holidays.”
   On December 28, 1877, a dispatch was received from General Radetsky about the surrender of all Turkish troops of General Wessel Pasha, in the amount of 10 batteries, 41 battalions and 1 cavalry regiment, and the occupation of Kazanlak by Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky, and Shipka by Skobelev. The joy of the Grand Duke, and then and the entire army and population was extraordinary: the sounds of the Russian anthem, covered with an incessant “cheers”, merged with the joyful chime of church bells, where thanksgiving prayers were performed. The Grand Duke sent a telegram to the Emperor with the following content: “Your Majesty’s Army has crossed the Balkans, and Russian banners are victoriously fluttering all the way from Sofia to Kazanlak.” with the inscription: “For crossing the Balkans in December 1877”, thanks to which the Grand Duke telegraphed the Sovereign that this “award gave him great pleasure, especially since he received it today in Kazanlak, after he personally crossed the Balkans”.
   On January 5, General Gurko occupied Philippopolis (this was the last major battle of this war), and on January 7, Turkish representatives arrived, whom the Grand Duke received the next morning and handed over peace terms.
   Meanwhile, the Turkish parliamentarians, referring to the insufficiency of their powers, refused to sign our demands and went to Constantinople for instructions. Testifying in one of his reports to the emperor that an incredible panic had begun among the Turks, the Grand Duke expressed “his extreme conviction that under the present circumstances it is already impossible to stop now and, in view of the refusal of peace conditions by the Turks, it is necessary to go to Constantinople, and there to complete the undertaken sacred work “On the evening of January 19, 1878, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, with the Turkish representatives who arrived at him in Adrianople, signed a protocol on the acceptance of preliminary peace conditions and the terms of a truce, which he immediately reported to the emperor, congratulating him on the successful end of the war. At the same time, the Grand Duke ordered all detachments to immediately stop hostilities. The conditions for peace on the Balkan Peninsula were as follows. Bulgaria received independence and its own Christian government, and Turkish troops were withdrawn from it; Montenegro, Romania and Serbia were recognized as independent, their territory increased; Bosnia and Herzegovina received independent administration, Turkey reimbursed Russia for its military costs and losses. The Grand Duke managed to extort from the Turkish representatives also the cleansing of all the fortresses on the Danube.

3. Nikolai Mikhailovich Baranov - the creator of the first Russian breech-loading rifle, the future lieutenant general and the St. Petersburg mayor.
   
   Soon after the Crimean War, the Russian command hastily began to equip the troops with rifled small arms. In a short time, a huge number of muzzle-loading rifles of the 1856 model were made. However, the civil war that broke out in the United States revealed the need to urgently replace them with treasury charging systems. The cheapest way of such a replacement would be to convert the stock rifles from muzzle-loading to breech-loading. Austria (the Wenzel rifle) and France (the Chaspeau rifle) were engaged in similar alterations, and it would also be a sin for us not to take advantage of this opportunity. Anticipating big profits, industrialists and inventors from all over the industrialized world will rush to Russia, and it would be rather difficult to give priority to one of them if Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin was not the Minister of War. He certainly knew who would pay what kind of courtship (in today's - rollback) for the introduction of a particular system. Most likely, it was Sylvester Krnka who promised the highest percentage, since it was the Krnka rifle that was put into service. However, few people know that in parallel with this system, a domestic project was also presented to the military department. The author of this project was then an unknown naval lieutenant Nikolai Mikhailovich Baranov.
   
   Russian 6-line muzzle-loading rifle of the 1856 model, which served as the basis for conversion into a Baranov rifle:
   Caliber - 15.24 mm. Length 1340 mm. Barrel length 939 mm. Weight without bayonet 4.4 kg. The mass of the powder charge is 4.78 g.
   Bullet weight - 35.19 g. Muzzle velocity - 348.6 m / s.

   In the breech of the barrel of the Baranov rifle, the chamber was cut, the receiver was screwed on, in which the bolt was attached to the hinge, which leaned up and forward. The lock had a trigger of an ordinary device. With the help of a hinged pin, the trigger was connected to the rod, which was included in a special channel made both in the breech and in the bolt. This rod, when the trigger was released, came into contact with the drummer, which at the same time moved forward, compressing the spring and breaking the cartridge primer. Thus, at the moment the trigger was pulled and the shot was fired, the bolt was securely coupled to the receiver and could not be thrown up. Two hook-shaped extractors are put on the hinge bolt on both sides. When the bolt was tilted up, the bolt platform hit the protruding ribs of the extractors, and their bent hooks pushed the spent cartridge case out of the chamber. To load and fire a shot, the trigger had to be cocked. In this case, the rod came out of the shutter channel and the latter could be thrown back; open the shutter by turning it by the handle upwards and applying some force so that the latch comes out of the recess in the box. Then it was necessary to put the cartridge into the chamber and close the shutter. When the bolt was closed, the cartridge moved into the barrel, and a shot could be fired. Despite the fact that the Baranov rifle was successfully tested, Milyutin preferred the Krnka rifle. She was armed with infantry companies - four out of five, which were then in the battalion. The fifth companies - rifle companies - were armed with Berdan rifles No. 1. The reason for not accepting the rifle of the Russian inventor was officially announced that it was inconvenient to load Baranov's vmntovka with the barrel in a vertical position - the open bolt of the bolt fell back under its own weight. However, what was the need for loading with a vertical placement of the barrel, the Milyutin ministry did not explain. In addition, Berdanka No. 1, a similar design of the shutter did not prevent it from being put into service. However, fortunately for the inventor, the military and naval departments were led at that time by different ministers, and the Baranov rifle was adopted by the Russian Imperial Navy. The fleet command appreciated the advantage of the Baranov rifle in accuracy, range and rate of fire, and the Minister of Marine, Admiral Nikolai Karlovich Krabbe, took a personal part in the fate of the rifle, agreeing on its production at the Putilov factory. Formally, the rifles of the Baranov system were replaced in 1870 by the rifles of the Berdan system, but in fact they continued to be used until the Russian-Turkish war. Before the Russian-Turkish war, Baranov served in a civilian shipping company and, with the outbreak of hostilities, offered to arm and use high-speed commercial vessels to attack enemy sea lanes. The initiative was punished by execution, and Baranov was instructed to re-equip the Vesta steamer, train its crew and take command of the newly-minted warship. On July 11, 1877, forty miles from Kyustenji, the Vesta met the Turkish battleship Fehti-Buland. The enemy started chasing Vesta, all the while firing artillery, but after a five-hour battle, he stopped the pursuit.
   
   Nikolai Karlovich Krabbe - manager of the naval ministry in 1860-76.
   Rifle system Baranova Russia, Tula. 1865 Steel, wood, copper.

   In December 1877, Baranov, commanding the newly adopted steamship Rossiya, made a successful raid to Penderaklia, where he took the Turkish steamship Mersina with a landing force of 800 Turks as a prize and delivered it to Sevastopol. For this case, Baranov was promoted to captain of the 1st rank.
   However, this was followed by a scandal: Lieutenant Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky, the future hero of the Tsushima defeat, published an article in which he described the battle as a “shameful flight” and accused Baranov of exaggerating the merits of Vesta. Despite the fact that Rozhdestvensky's accusations were not confirmed in court, Baranov was dismissed from the fleet, but was accepted into foot artillery service. In 1880, at the request of Loris-Melikov, Nikolai Mikhailovich was transferred to the police with the rank of colonel and sent abroad to organize supervision of Russian revolutionaries. In early 1881, Baranov was appointed acting governor of the Kovno province. After the assassination of Emperor Alexander II, Baranov took the post of St. Petersburg mayor, and then was governor in the Arkhangelsk and Nizhny Novgorod provinces. Baranov died on July 30, 1901. In memory of him, one of the destroyers of the Black Sea Imperial Fleet bore the name "Captain-Lieutenant Baranov".
   
   Nikolai Mikhailovich Baranov in the last years of his life.
   
   Destroyer "Captain-Lieutenant Baranov" on completion

4. Heroes and figures of the Russian - Turkish war of 1877 - 1878

   Major General V. F. Derozhinsky. Heroic defense of the Shipka Pass.

   Everyone still remembers with what an anxious feeling, the entire Russian people followed the seven-day fierce battle on Shipka. Fears for a successful outcome of the ongoing battle were all the more solid because a huge enemy army, numbering up to 50 thousand, under the command of one of the energetic Turkish commanders, Suleiman Pasha, overturned on an insignificant detachment of Russian troops defending the Shipka Pass. But no matter how stubborn the endless attacks of the Turks were, our brave soldiers, bearing terrible losses, defended their positions, thereby proving to the whole world what can be expected from the high qualities of selflessness and selfless courage of our troops.
   The Shipka Pass is known to be one of the best passes leading to the southern part of Bulgaria. By occupying this passage, the Russian army ensured freedom of movement of troops, ammunition, food, etc., in the event that it had to head across the Balkans. For a long time there was no definite information about the passage itself, and only the famous seven-day battle revealed its weak and strong points. The Shipka passage is not a passage at all in the true sense of the word. There are no gorges in it, there is no place in it where 300 people could repeat the Battle of Thermopylae; nor are there such trenches as in the Koiber Pass, in which an entire army could be annihilated without even being allowed to fight. The Shipka passage owes this name to the fact that the branch of the Balkans passing in this place, of less than average height, is one continuous chain stretching from the north from the Yantra valley to the south to the Tundzha valley, in which a more or less convenient path has been laid; in other places the Balkans are an interweaving of wild mountain masses, heaping one upon another.
   Under such circumstances, such a transition point as Shipka is taken as a gift from God; in other places such a path would seem impossible. The insignificant path turned into a big road. On the sides of this chain, the soil is pitted with ditches and gorges and, as a result, is extremely inconvenient for movement. The highest point of this chain has two mountain peaks near it, rising above it from both sides and, therefore, dominating both itself and all the space behind it. The first of these two peaks offers an excellent view of the road leading to the Russian positions. These peaks rise steeply and protect the access to the valleys that lie north of the Balkans.
   Prior to the seven-day battle, it was widely believed that the Shipka Pass was a completely impregnable natural fortification. In fact, it turned out that without artificial fortifications, the passage could be easily attacked by an advancing force and easily lost by a defending force.
   We then turn to a description of the battles that took place in the Shipka Pass for seven days, starting on August 9, during which many courageous defenders died, and in one of the battles, Major General V.F. Derozhinsky died a heroic death.

   In order to take possession of the passage, the Turks launched an attack on August 9, taking the heights behind the village of Shipka. The Russian garrison in the pass consisted of a Bulgarian legion and one regiment, both weakened by recent battles. In total we had 3,000 soldiers and 40 guns. Help could only be expected from Tyrnov, 40 miles from Shipka. The garrison worked tirelessly, preventing the Turks from moving forward a single step; then the latter broke into the Russian line on the hills behind the position located on Mount St. Nicholas, which is the highest point of the Shipka pass. Even in front of their trenches, the Russians laid mines, which were blown up as soon as the Turks stepped on them, and during this explosion, from 5 to 8 thousand Turks died; it is clear that this caused great harm to the enemy. On the first day, Russian troops lost only 200 people, mostly from the Bulgarian legion. On August 10, the battle was not hot: the Turks on this day had to make a big detour from the right and left flanks of the Russian positions. On August 11, the Turks attacked the Russians from the front and from the sides. The radical shortcomings of the position made themselves felt: fortunately,
   reinforcements arrived on time and things took a happy turn. No matter how diligently and bravely General Stoletov acted, despite the fact that he spent four days in tireless physical and mental activity, it would be difficult for him to resist the 50,000 army that attacked him from the front and sides. But now help arrived in time to help him under the command of the brave General Derozhinsky. The battle went on all day; By evening, the Turks surrounded the Russians so much that it seemed that they had only to shake hands with each other in order to find themselves on the main path in the rear of the Russians. The moment was highly critical.
   Both generals, expecting at any moment to see themselves surrounded on all sides by the Turks, sent a telegram to the Sovereign, in which they stated what position they were in, what they could still expect, how they intended to warn the enemy and that they would hold on to their positions, until reinforcements arrived. "In any case, they telegraphed, we and our soldiers will defend our positions to the last drop of blood."
   It struck six o'clock; the battle was interrupted for a while; however, our troops derived very little benefit from this; all their forces were involved in the matter. The soldiers were exhausted by the heat of the day, fatigue, hunger and thirst; for three days they had not eaten anything boiled; there was also no water. Nevertheless, the Turks got every piece of land very dearly; they still moved forward and forward, emitting joyful cries of “Allah il Allah!”
   Both generals stood on top and kept their eyes on the road that ran through the Yantra valley, along which reinforcements were to come. Suddenly, General Stoletov screams loudly, grabbing his comrade by the arm and pointing him to the road; a detachment of Russian troops appeared in the distance:

   Thank God! Thank God! - repeated General Stoletov ... But what is it, is it cavalry? Did General Radetzky make such a mistake that he sent cavalry into the Balkans against strong Turkish infantry?

   However, this is some kind of special cavalry; she actively entered into battle with Turkish artillery in the forest on a hill, limiting the Russian position on the right. Where did the horse riders go? And why do the horses go back? Here the matter was clarified. The riders turned out to be a battalion of a rifle brigade, the entire brigade is located just three kilometers from Shipka. But this brigade also had the merit that it was not the first time it had fought in the Balkans: it was the same brigade that made the first glorious crossing of the Balkans with General Gurko and participated in his amazing retreat. It is led by General Tsvetsinsky. On his orders, the arrows rush at the Turks and force them to retreat. General Radetzky, who personally led the riflemen to the battlefield, followed them with his staff, broke through the triple line of Turkish riflemen and joined the two generals who were waiting for him on the top of the hill. After praising General Stoletov for his brave defense, General Radetsky took command of all the troops.
   From that time on, one could only seriously think that the Shipka Pass would remain in the hands of the Russian troops. The consequences proved that the impetuous attacks of the Turks were shattered by the unshakable steadfastness and purely epic heroism of the Russian soldiers. The attacks were repulsed by the Russians one after another, until finally the weakened enemy had to abandon his intention to drive the Russian troops out of the Shipka Pass. On the day the reinforcements arrived and Radetzky assumed command of the troops, although it was possible not to renew the attacks on the Turkish positions that threatened the Russian right flank, everyone felt that it was impossible to be safe until the Turks were driven from this wooded mountain range. The left flank was only in relative safety.
   At dawn, ours again attacked the named position. Bulgarian boys carried water for Russian soldiers in clay jugs and even penetrated into the front ranks. The battle in the valley was indecisive and the reinforcements sent by the 9th Division did much good. By 9 o'clock General Dragomirov approached with two regiments of the 2nd brigade, which was part of his division. Leaving the Podolsk regiment in reserve, he moved with the Zhytomyr regiment up the dangerous road. The regiment was left in the redoubt at the top until it was needed. Radetsky and his staff remained on the slope of the summit, then General Dragomirov joined him.
   Rifle fire in the valley waxed and waned as the morning progressed. By 11 o'clock the fire became much stronger.
   The successes we achieved that day in the forest could not be judged by the density of this forest, but it was clear that the battle alternately leaned one way or the other. On the slope of the summit, from where the generals and headquarters watched the progress of the battle, the bullets buzzed like a swarm of angry bees. At this time, Dragomirov was wounded in the left leg.
   Meanwhile, the battle continued. The skirmishers and the Bryansk regiment were not successful in their enterprise to take the Turkish wooded slope with an attack from the front, although they managed to paralyze the efforts of the Turks, who wanted to break through to their left and go behind Russian lines. At 12 o'clock it was decided to make a counter-flank attack on the right slope of the Turkish mountain range, and once again launch the skirmishers and the rest of the detachments into the attack from below. Two battalions of the Zhytomyr regiment, leaving a company each in reserve, leave the partly covered first Russian position on the top and march in line across a fairly flat surface above the valley. Turkish guns and infantry open deadly fire on them, and many of them stain the grass with their blood. But the battalions rush forward irresistibly and rush into the forest; the Russian artillery, which prepared the way for them, had to be silent so as not to shoot at their soldiers.

   The turn in the fate of the battle came after an hour of terrible fighting; the Turks left their positions and the mountain range passed into our hands, which significantly ensured success in subsequent battles. How many feats of extraordinary courage, bravery and courage the Russians showed in defending their positions on Shipka; everyone, from the general to the soldier, showed themselves to be real heroes. There is no way to describe all the cases of the heroism of the Russian troops, and therefore we will cite here only one of the episodes that were mentioned in our newspapers.
   During the battle on August 13, the soldiers of the Bryansk regiment and the Bulgarian legion, who defended the fortification, called the "Turkish lunette", were left without cartridges by two o'clock in the afternoon. The fire stopped because there were no reserves. Encouraged by this, the Turks with the greatest courage rushed to storm this important position, and had already climbed to its top, when suddenly the Russians came out from behind the trenches and showered the Turks with a hail of large stones and logs rolling into the ravine from which the enemy emerged. Some of the daredevils who climbed onto the platform were stabbed with bayonets and went after their comrades. For an hour the Russians defended themselves with these new kinds of projectiles; finally, there were not enough stones, and the Russians began to fire at the Turks with broken guns, pieces of earth and pouches filled with small stones. Despite this, the Turks, encouraged by their officers, were already ready to take over the fortification, when suddenly a mighty “Hurrah!” resounding from the neighboring redoubts, announced the arrival of the vanguard of the shooters of General Radetzky.
   The degree of fierceness of the battle can be judged by the losses suffered by the combatants. That the Turks had to lose several times more compared to our losses is not surprising, since, firstly, the Turks rushed to the attack, and the Russian troops repulsed them, and secondly, the enemy tried to take over well-defended positions. During the entire seven-day, almost continuous battle, about 15,000 people were out of action among the Turks. But on our side, the losses were also quite large, since the heroic defenders of Shipka lost 98 officers and 2,633 lower ranks with one wounded. Of the top commanders, they were out of order: Major General V.F. Derozhinsky, who found a glorious death in the positions he defended, and His Majesty's retinue, Major General Dragomirov, who was wounded in the leg. Major-General V.F. Derozhinsky was mortally hit by a bullet in the cavity of the heart, and a fragment of a grenade severely wounded him in the head. He instantly lost consciousness, but continued to live for some time. In an unconscious state, he was sent to Gabrovo, where he soon died on August 13. The Russian army lost in this brave general one of the best military leaders. We report here his biography.
   Major General Valerian Filipovich Derozhinsky comes from the nobility of the Voronezh province. He was born on June 15, 1826, and in 1845, from non-commissioned officers of the 1st Cadet Corps, he was promoted to ensign of the 19th artillery brigade. Then, at the end of the course of sciences, in 1849, in the former Imperial Military, now the Nikolaev General Staff Academy, V. F. Derozhinsky had already, as an officer of the general staff, taken part in the former Eastern War. Being at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces in the Crimea, he received the rank of captain for his distinction in battle. In 1857 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and appointed chief of staff of the 4th Light Cavalry Division. In 1861, he was promoted to colonel and then for some time was a staff officer at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff to supervise the officers who studied at the aforementioned academy. By promotion to major general, in 1872, he was first appointed assistant chief of the 5th Infantry Division, and from 1873 he was commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division. V. F. Derozhinsky, in 1855, during the defense of Sevastopol, received a concussion in the head with a fragment of a bomb; but this shell shock, thanks to a healthy nature, did not affect any ailments in later life. The name of General Derozhinsky, as one of the most distinguished in the former, to date, hostilities, was repeatedly mentioned in the official communications of the august commander in chief.
   Derozhinsky left behind a wife and four children without a livelihood. As the newspapers reported, Mrs. Derozhinskaya was in St. Petersburg this spring, where she applied for an allowance. The fact is that on the occasion of the flood that was in Kremenchug at the beginning of 1877, they lost all their movable property and their own small house. Upon the death of her husband, Mrs. Derozhinskaya was given a decent pension, and her daughters were admitted to one of the St. Petersburg institutes for government support.
   
   St. Petersburg. Resurrection Novodevichy Convent and Novodevichy Cemetery.

   Bulgarian group "Episode" composition "O'Shipka"
   
   

5. Heroes and figures of the Russian - Turkish war of 1877 - 1878
   
   
   

   In the Russian-Turkish war
   
   In 1869, Major General M.I. Dragomirov became chief of staff of the Kyiv military district, and in 1873 he was appointed commander of the 14th Infantry Division. In these posts, he managed to create his own school of commanders of various ranks, who, when training subordinates, proceeded from the principle of preparing a soldier for independent actions in battle. Mikhail Ivanovich assigned an exceptionally important role to military discipline, advocated the strict legality of all relations in the army, which is mandatory for all military personnel, regardless of their official position.
   During this period, he worked hard on the development of shooting chain tactics. All controversial and unclear questions were soon answered by the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, which became a serious test for General Dragomirov.
   So, in one of the orders for the division entrusted to him, Mikhail Ivanovich wrote on the eve of the coming war: “People should be reminded more often about saving cartridges. For a sensible and not stunned person, thirty rounds per eye is enough, if they are fired only when it is possible to hit them.” Later researchers of Dragomirov's activities as a military leader regarded this appeal in a very peculiar way: as an underestimation of the role of fire on the battlefield and a clear preference for edged weapons. But in relation to such a strong specialist in the field of tactics as Dragomirov, one can see here an obvious overexposure. Not the exaltation of the bayonet, but the fear of excessive consumption of cartridges, the lack of which was always present in the Russian army, marked this order. After all, according to the charter, each soldier was given only 60 rounds of ammunition in a knapsack, and the same number was transported for him in the convoy. To increase the intensity of fire on the battlefield at that time was not allowed by the limited capacity for the production of cartridges. In addition, small arms were also imperfect. Berdan's rifle, which was in service, aimed at 1100 meters, and another rifle, which was also equipped with the Russian army - Krnka - hit only 450 meters. Thus, most soldiers had the ability to conduct aimed fire from a distance that was obviously insufficient in modern combat conditions. Meanwhile, many soldiers, showing impatience and nervousness, even without the command of a senior, often began to fire from afar, having no chance to hit the enemy, who was still outside the range of their fire. This, of course, only led to a senseless consumption of cartridges. These circumstances, apparently, had in mind Dragomirov, giving his order to save cartridges. At the same time, Mikhail Ivanovich argued that "a bullet and a bayonet do not exclude each other" and "bayonet education" has not lost its significance in the preparation of a soldier.
   The higher command drew up the disposition for the initial period of the war in such a way that Dragomirov's 14th Infantry Division was to be the first to enter the battle. And not somehow, but after forcing the wide Danube. Under these conditions, the creator of a new system of training and education of Russian soldiers had the opportunity to experience its fruitfulness from his own experience. On June 12, 1877, on the eve of crossing the Danube, he wrote in a letter: “I am writing on the eve of a great day for me, where it turns out that my system of education and training of soldiers is worth it and whether we both stand, i.e. me and my system, something."

   Having made the most difficult 600-kilometer off-road march on foot from Chisinau, from its borders on the Prut River across Romanian soil to the town of Zimnitsa on the left bank of the Danube, the 14th division was preparing to overcome the water barrier. It was necessary to cross the river at its widest point, and the opposite bank, occupied by the enemy, was elevated.
   The Danube - the largest river in Central Europe - was chosen by the Turkish side as the front line of defense. Here the enemy intended to arrange a truly "hot" meeting for the Russian troops. The Ottoman commander-in-chief Mahmet Ali Pasha swore an oath to the Sultan that he would not allow the Russians to enter the right, Turkish bank and, in the event of an attempt to force a force, would drown the army of infidels in the Danube.
   The place for the crossing was chosen in advance, between the town of Zimnitsa on the left, Romanian bank and the Bulgarian city of Sistovo on the right, enemy bank of the Danube. This place was not chosen by chance: here the wide river was divided into three branches, separated by the islands of Buzhirescu and Adda. The success of the crossing could only be counted on if surprise was achieved, therefore the place of the crossing was kept in the deepest secrecy, and all preparations for the operation were carried out in the strictest confidence. Dragomirov's division was to be the first to cross the Danube, push the Turks back from the coastline, occupy and expand the bridgehead for the main forces and hold it until they approach. Obviously, the choice fell on Mikhail Ivanovich not by chance. The headquarters and troops remembered and studied his work "On the landing of troops in ancient and modern times", and therefore they considered him a specialist in landing. Now the general had to test the conclusions made in this work in practice.
   The crossing was scheduled for June 15, and the decision on it was finally made only on June 11, so only 4 days were given to prepare for the crossing of the 14th Infantry - the minimum possible time for solving such a difficult task. Nevertheless, preparations for overcoming the water barrier were carried out extremely clearly. By order of the divisional commander, soldiers were trained to quickly board and disembark pontoons. Natural conditions made the task more difficult. The width of the river at the crossing site as a result of a strong flood exceeded a kilometer. The terrain did not contribute to the attacking side either. At Zimnitsa, in the place of concentration of Russian forces, the coast was gentle, low, and the opposite coast was high and steep. But the task was slightly facilitated by the fact that the Danube was divided into branches, which made it possible to force it sequentially, overcoming one water barrier after another. After conducting reconnaissance and organizing the preparation of crossing facilities, Dragomirov issued an order, aphoristic in form and very capacious in essence: “The last soldier must know where and why he is going. Then, even if the leader is killed, people not only do not get lost, but even with greater bitterness climb forward. Never give a retreat, never give a retreat and warn people that if such a signal is heard, then this is only a deception on the part of the enemy. We have neither a flank nor a rear and cannot have one; the front is always where the enemy is coming from.
   The main forces of the Turkish troops were located at some distance from Sistovo - the crossing point, in the areas of Tarnovo, Ruschuk and Nikopol. In Sistovo itself there was a garrison of one and a half thousand people. But it was necessary to attack the right bank quickly, suddenly, without giving the enemy time to bring up forces from other garrisons. To ensure absolute surprise, units of the 14th division concentrated in the area of ​​the crossing covertly, and to misinform the enemy in other areas along the left bank of the Danube, a number of false demonstrations of the impending crossing were undertaken. As a result, the enemy missed the decisive moment.
   The crossing was started on June 15, 1877 at two in the morning. The infantry sat on pontoons, the artillery was transported on rafts. A thousand people and several guns were transported in one flight - there were just enough boats. First, a part of the Volynsky regiment headed for the enemy shore. In the first minutes everything went smoothly, like clockwork, but soon the wind picked up, waves suddenly appeared on the river, and the pontoons scattered all over the mirror of the river, the fighters on them began to lose sight of each other. Meanwhile, we still had to climb a steep, twenty-meter cliff on the opposite bank and drag the guns ...
   When the forward detachment was only 150 meters from the shore, the enemy guard pickets noticed it and opened fire on the river. It was about 3 o'clock in the morning when the Volhynians reached the right bank and immediately entered into a fierce battle. Not allowing the Russians to gain a foothold, the Turkish companies that arrived in time from the Varden garrison rushed hand-to-hand, trying to push the enemy off the steep bank. But Dragomirov did not leave the advance detachment without support: the remnants of the Volynsky regiment were soon transferred, followed by the Minsk regiment and the 4th rifle brigade. Mikhail Ivanovich also arrived with the brigade on the right bank. He took vigorous measures to ensure that the units that crossed were firmly entrenched in the captured patch, began to expand and strengthen it.
   From dawn the crossing of the main forces began. The enemy, who had pulled up reserves to the Danube, had the opportunity to conduct aimed fire at those crossing, but the batteries from the left bank quickly suppressed the firepower of the Turks.
   At 11 a.m. on June 15, the entire Dragomirov division, in full combat readiness, was already on the right, Danube bank. The initial, most risky stage of the offensive was successfully completed. To this day, specialists count the excellent training of the troops, the habit of independence developed in each soldier, and in each officer - to the initiative, among the components of his success.
   Having entrenched himself on the bridgehead and repelled all the counterattacks of the Turks, Dragomirov went on the offensive and, after two hours of battle, took the nearest outpost of the Ottoman defense - the city of Sistovo and the heights surrounding it. The first brilliant victory in this war cost the Russians 300 men killed and about 500 wounded. This was the beginning of the first offensive in the Balkans.
   Military authorities recognized the crossing of the Danube at Zimnitsa and the battle for Sistovo as classics of military art. This experience of overcoming a large water barrier will soon be studied in all military academies in Europe. After all, until now, military history has not known such examples of a large formation under enemy fire on the move taking such a water line as the Danube, and even with almost symbolic losses.
   Meanwhile, the offensive of the Russian army to the Balkans began. And here again the 14th Infantry Division of General Dragomirov distinguished himself, having said his weighty word in the battles for holding the strategically important Shipka Pass. By the end of July 1877, General Gurko, in connection with the failures of his neighbors - the Western and Eastern detachments, withdrew his central group from the central direction back beyond the Balkans. But as a springboard for the subsequent offensive and to maintain the strength of the front, back in mid-July, during the period of the highest successes of Gurko beyond the Balkans, a southern group was created, which had an extreme point on the Shipka Pass, under the command of Lieutenant General Fyodor Radetsky. In early August, the strong army of Suleiman Pasha fell upon the defenders of Shipka with all its might.
   The defense on Shipka was held only by the squads of the Bulgarian people's militia and the Oryol infantry regiment. Starting from August 9, the Ottomans stormed Shipka for 6 days in a row. They had a huge superiority in men and artillery; regardless of the losses, Suleiman Pasha drove one of his regiment after another into the attack. In the afternoon of August 11, it began to seem that the enemy had achieved his goal and was having an undoubted success. A handful of Russians and Bulgarians on the pass defended themselves with their last strength, the enemy had almost won a complete victory over her, when suddenly strong reinforcements arrived in time for the defenders - parts of Dragomirov's 14th Infantry Division. In 30-degree heat, without closing their eyes, they made a 160-kilometer march in 4 days and joined the battle from the march. A powerful counterattack by the Dragomirovsky youths made it possible to quickly throw back the Ottoman assault columns from the pass. After that, fierce battles for Shipka continued for three more days; Suleiman Pasha did not believe that the key to victory, which he already held, had suddenly slipped out of his hands. The soldiers of the 14th Infantry Division showed themselves brilliantly in this multi-day battle, and although they failed to push the enemy away from the pass, he himself remained in the hands of the Russian troops.

   In these last August battles for Shipka, Mikhail Ivanovich was seriously wounded in the leg and was out of action until the end of the war.
   For heroism, courage and diligence shown in these battles, he was promoted to lieutenant general, then to adjutant general and was appointed head of the Academy of the General Staff. Being in this post, he publishes many scientific, pedagogical and journalistic works. His "Textbook of tactics" for more than two decades has been the main textbook in this discipline both in military schools and in the academy itself. For 11 years, Dragomirov headed the leading military educational institution in Russia, which trained personnel of the highest qualification, turned the academy into a true temple of military science. In the 1980s, he twice traveled to France to get acquainted with the latest achievements of European military technology. Recognizing the expediency of their introduction in the Russian army, he still believes that the main thing is not what the weapon is, but how the soldier wields it and how he is set to win.
   In 1889, he was appointed commander of the troops of the Kyiv military district, the following year he was promoted to general from infantry, and soon, while retaining his post of commander, he was also awarded the posts of governor-general of Kyiv, Podolsk and Volyn. In this new capacity, he does not get tired of fighting with drill, inspiring generals and officers that a soldier is a person with reason, will and feelings, and requires in every possible way to develop his best natural inclinations and human qualities. By this time, Dragomirov was firmly established as an advanced military thinker, an innovator of tactics, and a resurrector of Suvorov's traditions.
   This is evidenced, in particular, by the “Field Charter” written by him, with which the Russian army began the war with Japan in 1904.
   In 1901, Emperor Nicholas II awarded Mikhail Ivanovich the highest Russian award - the Order of St. Apostle Andrew the First-Called. At the age of 73, Mikhail Ivanovich retired and was enrolled as a member of the State Council.
   After the Mukden defeat in February 1905, Nicholas II seriously considered the issue of replacing the commander-in-chief in the Far East, A.N. Kuropatkin on Dragomirov, but Mikhail Ivanovich rejected this proposal.
   The general spent the last years of his life in household chores and efforts to improve his farm.
   Mikhail Ivanovich died on his farm near Konotop at the height of the 1905 revolution, on October 15, and rested in the church built by his father. And the bright memory of him was kept both in the Russian army and in the Soviet one; it is also being revived in the current Armed Forces.

6. Heroes and figures of the Russian - Turkish war of 1877 - 1878

   Death and oblivion
   
   On June 25, 1882, a frightened guest ran into the janitor's room of the Angleterre Hotel at the corner of Stoleshnikov Lane and Petrovka, it was the famous Moscow cocotte, German Charlotte Altenrose, she said that an officer had died in her room. The police who arrived at the scene immediately identified him as General Skobelev. The doctor who carried out the cover-up stated that the death was the result of
   sudden paralysis of the heart, which, according to him, was in a terrifying state. The next day, rumors spread around Moscow that Skobelev had been poisoned by German agents. Rumors were fueled by the sudden disappearance of Charlotte's footman and a number of other strange circumstances. A day before his death, Skobelev handed over some documents to his friend Aksakov, saying that he feared for their fate. Subsequently, they were kidnapped by unknown persons. Other versions have also been put forward. According to one of them, Skobelev was killed by members of the secret organization of aristocrats, the Sacred Squad, who feared that he might lead a military coup. In any case, unexpected
   the mysterious death of the 38-year-old general shocked the whole of Russia. His funeral turned into a national event. All major national publications wrote about them.
   
   The body of General Skobelev
   In 1912, opposite the building of the Moscow Governor-General, a monument to Skobelev was solemnly opened. He became a symbol of the extraordinary popularity that the name of the general enjoyed in all sectors of Russian society. During his lifetime, he was compared with Alexander Suvorov, squares and cities were named after him, songs were composed about his exploits and campaigns.
   
   Opening of the monument to Skobelev in Moscow
   After the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs from the Ottoman yoke, in almost every peasant hut, next to the icons, one could see a portrait of Skobelev. Enterprising merchants used this extraordinary popularity of the general in their own way. In pre-revolutionary Russia, Skobelev sweets, chocolate, gingerbread, cigarettes and wines were produced. Not a single military commander in Russian history has been honored with such popular adoration.
   At the same time, after 1917, not a single Russian commander was given over to such total oblivion and defamation as General Skobelev. Today, on the site of the monument to the hero of the Russian-Turkish war, the figure of the founder of Moscow, Yuri Dolgoruky, rises. Many generations of Muscovites did not even suspect that before the revolution this square, which, by the way, was also called Skobelevskaya, looked completely different. The monument was a granite pedestal on which a four-meter equestrian statue of a general towered, on the right was a group of Russian soldiers protecting the banner during one of the Central Asian campaigns. On the left, soldiers going on the attack during the Russian-Turkish war for the liberation of the Slavs. On the reverse side of the pedestal was attached a board with parting words from Skobelev to his soldiers near Plevna.
   On May 1, 1918, the monument to the general was barbarously destroyed on the personal instructions of Lenin, in accordance with the decree on the removal of monuments erected in honor of the tsars and their servants. All the bronze figures and bas-reliefs, and even the lanterns that surrounded the monument, were sawn, broken into pieces and sent for remelting. But I had to tinker with the granite pedestal, it did not give in to any tools, and then it was decided to blow it up, but the pedestal was completely destroyed only on the fifth attempt. Then began the ruthless uprooting of the name Skobelev from Russian history. In accordance with the new guidelines of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, Soviet historians declared the general to be the enslaver and oppressor of the working masses of the fraternal East. The name of Skobelev remained banned even during the Great Patriotic War, when the names of Suvorov and Kutuzov were returned from oblivion. On the site of the destroyed monument to the general, a plaster monument to revolutionary freedom was erected, which was later replaced by Yuri Dolgoruky.

7. Heroes and figures of the Russian - Turkish war of 1877 - 1878
   A graduate of the Nikolaev Engineering School, who completed the full course of engineering education at the end of the officer classes. In 1828 he was promoted to officer, in 1833 he entered the Imperial Military Academy and upon graduation was transferred to the General Staff, where he held various administrative positions until 1849, when he was appointed commander of the regiment of Prince Eugene of Württemberg. In 1858 he received command of the Keksholmsky Grenadier Regiment, and in 1859 - the Life Guards Volynsky Regiment with promotion to major general.
   In 1863 he was appointed commander of the 27th Infantry Division, with which he took part in the suppression of the Polish rebellion, and was awarded a golden saber. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1865, in 1876 he was given command of the IX Army Corps, which was assigned to the Danube Army, which acted against the Turks.
   An operation against the Nikopol fortress was assigned to Kridener's corps, which he took on July 4, 1877. Awarded for this deed with the Order of St. George 3rd degree, Kridener was moved with his corps to Plevna, but his actions here on July 8 and 18 were unsuccessful. Remaining at the head of the corps, he took part in the blockade of Plevna and repulsed the breakthrough of Osman Pasha's troops from it, and then commanded the left column of the troops of General Gurko's detachment during the winter campaign for the Balkans. At the end of the war, promoted to general of infantry, he was appointed assistant commander of the Warsaw Military District. Died in 1891.